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implementing the Directive, but this objective would also be accomplished after the appli-
cation of Art. 23 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008.140
Besides, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has not only approached a
definition of this complex category, but has also tried to restrict its application in order
to make mandatory provisions – in the field of Labour Law – compatible with community
freedoms (i.e. cases Arblade141 andMazzoleni)142, thus favouring the integrative objective of
the EU.143 In accordance with that has been mentioned, only a limited number of Labour
Law provisions (those establishing minimum working conditions) can be characterized as
mandatory in relation to Art. 8.144 In this respect, the following conditions could be men-
tioned as mandatory: health, safety and hygiene at work, right to strike, redundancy protec-
tion, or minimum rest periods.145 In relation to this, Art. 3 Directive 96/71/EC offers a good
illustration of the kind of terms of conditions covered by this category, when listing the
“hard core”.146
Finally, mandatory provisions could be contained not only in the collective agreements and
arbitration awards affecting the contract of employment, but also in the following national
laws (in accordance to Arts. 8 and 9 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008): the law applicable to the
individual contract of employment, the law of the place where the work has to be performed
and the law of the competent forum.147
Article 9: Overriding mandatory provisions
1. Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation,
to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of
the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.
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naje al Profesor Julio D. González Campos, 1833–1834.
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147 Guardans Cambó, 444 et seq. The accumulation of these provisions may cause a protection “at any cost”,
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2. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of
the law of the forum.
3. Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those
overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering
whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to
the consequences of their application or non-application.
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I. General Remarks
1. Purpose of the rule
1 In the system for the determination of the applicable law instituted by the Rome I Regula-
tion, an important role is attributed to the “overriding mandatory provisions”, dealt with by
Art. 9 of the Regulation. This provision aims at ensuring a balance between the main
objectives of the Regulation, in particular the uniformity of the choice-of-law rules among
the Member States and the admission of party autonomy, on the one hand, and the safe-
guard of fundamental States’ interests, on the other.1
2 The choice-of-law rules included in the Regulation are mainly based on the protection of
party interests. This is obviously the case for Art. 3, which recognizes party autonomy in a
quite broad way. Failing a party choice, most of the connecting factors of Arts. 4, 5 and 7 are
also conceived with the purpose of striking a balance between the parties’ interests, in
particular by giving priority to the party who is to effect the characteristic performance
under the contract. Finally, the declared goal of Arts. 6 and 8 is to protect the weaker party,
i.e. the consumer or the employee.
3 States’ regulatory interests do not play a central role in the economy of the Regulation,
contrary to the prevailing approach in the United States, where, since the so-called “Amer-
ican revolution”, conflicts of laws are commonly addressed through the prism of “govern-
mental interests’ analysis”.2 This is partially corrected by Art. 9.3 This provision deals with
thosemandatory rules whose observance is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding
its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation. Because of their
importance for the State that has enacted them, such provisions must be observed even in
international situations, irrespective of the law governing the contract under the normally
applicable choice-of-law rules of the Regulation.
4 The practical importance of Art. 9 should not been overestimated.4 As stressed by Recital 37
of the preamble, the application of overriding mandatory provisions is only allowed “in
exceptional circumstances”, as it is also the case for public policy under Art. 21. According to
the ECJ, Art. 9 – “as a derogating measure” –must be interpreted strictly.5 Particularly rare
are the courts’ decisions giving effect to foreign overriding mandatory provision, as allowed
by Art. 9 (3).6
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1 The need for a balance between overriding mandatory provisions and the principle of the freedom of
contract was underlined by the ECJ, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. Navigation
Maritime Bulgare, (Case C-184/12) (2013), para. 49.
2 As is well-known, interest analysis was first proposed by Brainerd Currie: see his Selected Essays on the
Conflict of Laws (1963). On the distinction between the American interest analysis and the European
notion of overriding mandatory provisions, see Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police, A Functional
Trend in Continental Private International Law, AJCL (1991), p. 681 et seq.
3 See Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016), para. 43.
4 Magnus, para. 2.
5 Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016), para. 44.
6 See, however, the recent ECJ decision in the case Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/
15) (2016). See also Cour d’Appel de Paris, 25.2.2015 – 12/23757.
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2. Terminology
5The term “overriding mandatory provisions”, which now appears in the title and in the
wording of Art. 9, has been preferred to “mandatory provisions” used in Art. 7 Rome
Convention. This expression refers to the capacity of these provisions to “override” (i.e.
to “be more important than”, to “prevail over”) the otherwise applicable law. Other terms
used in legal English to define such provisions are “overriding statutes” or “internationally
mandatory rules”.7
6This language was chosen in order to clearly distinguish such rules from simply “internally”
(or “domestically”) mandatory provisions, which cannot be derogated from by contract.
Internally mandatory provisions must be observed in purely domestic situations; they must
also be complied with in international situations, but only when they belong to the law
applicable to the contract. By contrast, overriding mandatory provisions are applicable, in
international situations, even when they are not part of the law governing the contract. In
order to avoid confusion between these notions, all references to “mandatory provisions”,
which were included in the Rome Convention were replaced with the language “provision
[…] which cannot be derogated from by contract” (see Arts. 3 (3), 3(4), 6 (1) and 8 (2) of the
Regulation). The term “mandatory provisions” is now only used in Art. 9 of the Regulation.8
7In the French version of the Regulation, the expression “lois de police”, echoing Art. 3 of the
French Civil Code and widely-used in French legal doctrine and case law, corresponds to
that used in Art. 7 Rome Convention. It has been preferred to other common expressions,
such as “lois d’application immédiate” or “règles d’ordre public”. The same term (“leyes de
policía”) has been used in the Spanish text, although it is not very common in the Spanish
legal language (where these provisions are normally qualified as “normas de aplicación
necesaria”). In the German version, “Eingriffsnormen”, which refers to the ability of these
norms to “interfere” (“eingreifen”) in the contractual relationship in order to safeguard
public interests,9 has been preferred to “zwingende Vorschriften” (or “international zwin-
gende Vorschriften”). In Italian and Portuguese, the terms “norme di applicazione neces-
saria” and “normas de aplicação imediata” reflect the general use.
3. Remarks as to Methodology
8In conformity with the doctrinal understanding, overriding mandatory provisions require a
different approach to conflict of law issues. To rule on their applicability, the court does not
have to determine “which law is applicable” to a certain relationship, but rather whether the
object and the purpose, or, in other words, the policy of a mandatory rule, commands its
application in the particular case. Using German terminology, one can say that, in the
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seq.; Schulte, Die Anknüpfung von Eingriffsnormen, insbesondere wirtschaftrechtlicher Art, im inter-
nationalen Vertragsrecht (1975); Drobnig, Die Beachtung von ausländischen Eingriffsgesetzen – eine
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presence of such norms, the solution of a conflict-of-law issue requires reasoning based on
the content and purpose of a rule (“vom Gesetze aus”) and not, as with “classical” conflict-
of-laws methodology inspired by von Savigny’s theory, on the legal issue (“vom Sachverhalt
her”).
9 Contrary to classical, “bilateral” choice-of-law rules, which can indistinctly lead to the
application of the lex fori or of a foreign law, overriding mandatory provisions are the
expression of a “unilateral” approach to conflict of laws. Based on their content and their
policy, these rules unilaterally determine their own scope of application, irrespective of the
choice-of-law rules of the forum. Such unilateral determination of the rule’s scope cannot be
directly “extrapolated” in order to determine the applicability of similar provisions belong-
ing to a different legal system; the applicability of these foreign rules depends, in turn, on
their own content and policy.
10 Notwithstanding a certain similarity with the policy-oriented methodology proposed in the
United States by the tenants of the “interest analysis”,10 the European approach is less radical
than the American approach.11While interest analysis applies to all kinds of legal rules and is
meant to entirely replace “bilateral”, “jurisdiction-selecting” choice-of-law rules, overriding
mandatory provisions coexist in the Regulation with “classical” choice-of-law rules and only
exceptionally prevail over them. This is one expression of what has been called “a pluralist
approach” to conflict of laws, meaning that different methodologies are used in parallel in
order to attain a balanced solution to conflict-of-laws issues.
4. Legislative history of the provision
11 The predecessor of Art. 9 was Art. 7 Rome Convention, a widely discussed provision. Art. 7
(2) of the Convention dealt with the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. Al-
though the effects of that rule were not disputed, it raised the very difficult and controversial
question of the characterisation of a national rule as an overriding mandatory provision.
Art. 7 (1) of the Convention was even more controversial, since it opened up the possibility
for the national courts to “give effect” to foreign mandatory provision not belonging to the
law of the contract. Fearing the lack of legal certainty allegedly caused by this provision and
its potentially disruptive effects on the uniformity of the applicable law, five Contracting
States (Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom) made a reser-
vation against Art. 7 (1), as allowed by Art. 22 Rome Convention.
12 In its Proposal,12 the Commission suggested including the definition of overriding manda-
tory provision, which we find now in Art. 9 (1). Besides some drafting changes, no other
significant novel additions were included in the Proposal. During the subsequent legislative
stages, the negotiation focused on the future of Art. 7 (1).
13 The new provision of Art. 9 introduces various novel changes, one of which is purely formal
whereas the other two relate to very substantial issues. At the formal level, the order of the
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two paragraphs of Art. 7 of the Convention has been judiciously reversed. The provision of
Art. 7 (2) of the Convention relating to overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori,
which has become Art. 9 (2) of the Regulation, now precedes the rule relating to foreign
overriding mandatory provisions that has been included, with certain important modifica-
tions, in the third paragraph of Art. 9. This amendment, which is purely cosmetic and
without practical effect, deserves approval, since it simplifies the comprehension of this
complex provision.Muchmore significant are themodifications relating to the substance, in
particular the introduction of a definition of overriding mandatory provisions in Art. 9 (1)13
and the reformulation in a more restrictive manner of the conditions for the application (or
the consideration) of the foreign overriding mandatory provisions under Art. 9 (3).14
5. Comparison with other texts
a) Rome II Regulation
14Some other European regulations on private international law also include a specific section
dealing with overriding mandatory provisions. Thus, Art. 16 Rome II Regulation on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations refers to the overriding mandatory provision of
the lex fori. The language of this provision is identical to that of Art. 7 (2) Rome Convention.
In substance, the rule also corresponds to Art. 9 (2) Rome I Regulation. However, Art. 16
does not, unlike Art. 9 (1), include a definition of overridingmandatory provisions, nor does
it include a provision dealing with foreign mandatory provisions such as that seen in Art. 9
(3).15
However, without referring to overriding provisions, Art. 17 Rome II Regulation resembles
Art. 9 (3), in that it provides that “account shall be taken” of the rules of safety and conduct
which are in force at the place of the event giving rise to the liability.16
b) Succession Regulation
15The Succession Regulation includes in Art. 30 a provision referring to the “special rules”
which are “applicable irrespective of the law applicable to the succession”. These overriding
mandatory provisions must apply to the succession when, “for economic, family or social
considerations”, they “impose restrictions concerning or affecting the succession” in respect
of specific assets (such as immovable property, certain enterprises or other special categories
of assets) located in the country where the provisions are in force. This rule is not limited to
mandatory rules of the lex fori but also covers foreign mandatory rules provided that they
belong to the law of the place of the asset’s location.
c) Matrimonial Property and Registered Partnership Regulations
16The regulations on Matrimonial Property and on the Property Consequences of Registered
Partnership both contain a provision (Art. 22 resp. Art. 17) referring to the overriding
mandatory provision of the lex fori. The language of these sections includes a definition
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on the line of Art. 9 (1) Rome I Regulation. However, no reference is provided to foreign
mandatory provisions.
d) Other regulations
17 Other PIL regulations do not even refer to overriding mandatory provisions. This is the case
for the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce and of the Maintenance
Regulation; for the purpose of determining the applicable law, the latter refers to the Hague
Protocol of 23 November 2007, which does not include a section on overriding mandatory
provisions.
e) National codifications
18 Several national codifications of private international law include a section referring to
overriding mandatory provisions.17 However, only a few of them contain a definition of
such provisions. Even rarer are provisions on foreign overriding mandatory rules.18
f) International instruments
19 Besides the Rome Convention, other international instruments also include specific norms
on overriding mandatory provisions. This is the case for some Hague Conventions, such as
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency of 14 March 1978 (Art. 16), the
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and their Recognition of 1 July 1985
(Art. 16) and the Hague Principles on Choice of law in International Commercial Contracts
(Art. 11).19 The Mexico Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts (CIDIP V) of 17
March 1994 also includes a specific provision (Art. 11).
II. The Scope of Application of Art. 9 and its Relationship to Other Provisions of the
Regulation
1. Scope of application
a) Material scope
20 As a part of the Rome I Regulation, Art. 9 directly governs overriding mandatory provisions
in the area of contracts, i.e. such provisions, which, irrespective of their private or public law
nature, have an effect on the formation, the validity, or the interpretation of a contract, or on
the rights and duties of the parties thereof.
21 In the absence of a “Rome 0 Regulation”, covering the general questions of private inter-
national law, the definition of overriding mandatory provisions in Art. 9 (1) is probably also
relevant for other European regulations, which refer to this category of norms without
defining them, such as the Rome II Regulation (Art. 16) and the regulations on matrimonial
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property and the property consequences of registered partnership.20 However, paragraphs 2
and 3 of Art. 9 do not have this indirect function. Therefore, it is not possible, in the absence
of a specific provision in the relevant regulation, to resort to Art. 9 Rome I Regulation in
order to apply or to give effect to overriding mandatory provisions in areas of law other than
contractual obligations.
22It has been suggested that the reference in some provisions of the Rome II Regulation (such
as Arts. 4 (3), 10 (1), 11 (1) and 12 (1)) to the law applicable to the contract also encompasses
Art. 9.21 However, such an extension of Art. 9’s scope is not a matter of course. It seems that
either the overriding mandatory provision has an effect on the contract as such (and is
therefore not relevant for the non-contractual obligations falling under the Rome II Regu-
lation), or it specifically applies to the non-contractual obligation at hand; in the latter case,
it is not covered by Art. 9 but by its counterpart, Art. 16 Rome II Regulation, which does not
provide for third countries’ provisions.
b) Universal application
23As all other rules of the Rome I Regulation, Art. 9 enjoys a universal scope (Art. 2). In other
words, the overriding mandatory provisions referred to by this rule are applicable whether
or not they are part of the law of a Member State. This is not relevant for Art. 9 (2), which
only refers to the overriding mandatory provision of the lex fori (which necessarily is the law
of a Member State), but for Art. 9 (3): this rule allows the court, under certain conditions, to
give effect to foreign overriding provisions, irrespective of whether they are part of the law of
a Member State or not.
2. Art. 9 and other provisions of the Regulation
a) Art. 9 and the “ordinary” choice-of-law rules of the Regulation
24Art. 9 belongs to the provisions of the Regulation with a general scope of application. As with
Arts. 3 and 4, but contrary to Arts. 5 to 8 of the Regulation, Art. 9 is applicable to contracts in
general and not to some specific categories of contracts only.
25Art. 9 applies in parallel with Arts. 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Regulation. These choice-of-law rules
determine the law applicable to the contract. Irrespective of this, Art. 9 allows, under certain
conditions, the application of overriding mandatory rules belonging to the lex fori or to the
law of a third State. When such rules are applicable under Art. 9, they prevail over any
irreconcilable provision belonging to the law of the contract. In this sense, one can say that
Art. 9 partially derogates from the choice-of-law rules included in the Regulation.
b) Art. 9 and the protective choice-of-law rules of Arts. 6 and 8
26The relationship of Art. 9 with Arts. 6 and 8 of the Regulation is much more controversial.
Latter provisions contain special choice-of-law rules, the objective of which is to protect the
weaker party to the contract, i.e. the consumer and the employee respectively. This goal is
pursued, on one hand, by submitting the contract to a law, with which the weaker party is
particularly familiar, i.e. respectively the law of the country of the consumer’s habitual
residence and the law of the place where (or from where) the employee habitually carries
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out his work (Arts. 6 (1) and 8 (2)). On the other hand, if the parties have chosen the law
applicable to the contract, such a choice cannot have the result of depriving the weaker party
of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory provisions of the law, which would be
applicable in the absence of a choice (Arts. 6 (2) and 8 (1)). In this framework, it is disputed
whether Art. 9 can also be relied upon by the weaker party in order to invoke a protective
provision, which would not be applicable under Arts. 6 or 8.22
27 Before taking a position, it should be noted that the problemmainly arises in two scenarios.23
The first one is when, although the contract is a consumer contract covered by Art. 6, the
specific conditions set up by this provision are not satisfied: this is the case, in particular,
when the trader did not pursue his activities in the country of the consumer’s habitual
residence, nor did he direct such activities to that country, as required by Art. 6 (1). Can
a protective provision in force in the country of the consumer’s habitual residence be none-
theless applied based on Art. 9?24 The second situation arises when, although all conditions
set up by Arts. 6 and 8 are satisfied, the weaker party relies on a protective rule belonging to a
law other than that designated by those choice-of-law rules: for instance, failing a party
choice, can the consumer invoke, based on Art. 9, a rule in force in the country of the trader’s
place of business? Can the employee rely on a rule in force in the country of its own habitual
residence?
28 To answer this question, it is first necessary to determine whether a provision aimed at the
protection of the weaker party can qualify as an overriding mandatory provision within the
meaning of Art. 9. As will be shown when discussing the definition of overriding mandatory
provisions under Art. 9 (1), the answer is probably yes.25 However, this does not yet mean
that Art. 9 can be applied concurrently with Arts. 6 and 8. In fact, according to a widely held
view,26 which was endorsed by German courts under the Rome Convention,27 the concur-
rent application of these provisions should be rejected, because recourse to Art. 9 when the
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uncommon).
24 Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–033.
25 See infra, Art. 9 para. 76 et seq.
26 See for instance Roth, in: Festschrift für Gunther Kühne (2009), p. 868; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9
Rom I-VO, para. 26.
27 Bundesgerichtshof, 19.3.1997, published in French in RCDIP (1998), p. 610, with note by Lagarde. See
also Bundesgerichtshof, 26.10.1993, IPRax (1994), p. 449.
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conditions set up byArts. 6 and 8 are not satisfied would be inconsistent with the rationale of
these rules.
29In our opinion, the concurrent application of Art. 9 is in itself not inconsistent with Arts. 6
and 8, in particular because these provisions do not share the same purpose.28 Arts. 6 and 8
specifically aim at the protection of the weaker parties as individuals. They only focus on
such individual interests, and determine how and under which conditions those interests
should be protected. Thus, by setting the specific conditions of Art. 6 (1), the drafter of the
Regulation considered that a consumer should only be entitled to rely on the protective rules
of his country’s law when the trader, in some way, “targeted” that country; failing this, the
consumer does not deserve a specific protection. However, Art. 9 has a different purpose, its
goal being the safeguarding of a country’s public interests. As made clear by its wording,
recourse to this article is only possible when the application of a specific provision (even if it
is a rule protecting consumers or employees) is regarded by a country as crucial for safe-
guarding its political, social or economic organisation. The individual consumer’s interests
are not decisive in this regard. That being so, it is perfectly conceivable, at least in theory, that
a country has a crucial interest in compliance with a specific overriding mandatory provi-
sion in the area of consumer or employment law, even though the specific conditions of
Arts. 6 or 8 are not satisfied.
30In practice, however, this will only very rarely be the case, in particular in the area of
consumer law, where the protection net of Art. 6 is now very wide.29 Thus, it is extremely
unlikely that the country of the consumers’ habitual residence will assert a crucial public
interest in protecting its consumers when they were not specifically “targeted” by foreign
traders, such as when they buy goods or services during their holidays abroad.30 It is also
unlikely that a country other than the country of the consumer’s habitual residence will have
a crucial interest in imposing the application of its mandatory rules for the protection of
“foreign” consumers. The conditions for a concurrent application of Art. 9 can probably
more easily be satisfied in the area of employment law: thus, it cannot be a priori excluded
that a country might have a crucial interest in protecting its citizens through mandatory
regulations when involved in working activities abroad. In any case, these instances are
probably quite rare: thus, the concurrent application of Arts. 6, 8 and 9, albeit theoretically
possible, should be allowed only in very exceptional cases.31
31However, preceding remarks only refer to mandatory rules protecting the consumers or the
employees. The analysis is completely different with regard to overriding mandatory provi-
sions having a different goal, notably the safeguarding of a State’s political or economic
interests. With respect to such norms, there is no doubt that Art. 9 can be applied in parallel
with Arts. 6 and 8. Thus, embargo measures prohibiting the import of specific goods from a
foreign country are obviously applicable under Art. 9, even when they impact on a consumer
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contract. Also, provisions reducing the salary of employees in the public sector for reason of
financial difficulties of the employer State can fall under Art. 9.32
32 It should also be pointed out that the applicability of Art. 9 should not be disputed when the
contract is not covered by Arts. 6 or 8, either because it is not a consumer or employment
contract within the meaning of these provisions (for instance an insurance contract, a
carriage contract or a commercial agency contract), or because it is specifically excluded
from the scope of Art. 6 under paragraph 4. In such cases, in the absence of special choice-of-
law rules, the protection of the weaker party is only possible under Art. 9 provided that one
country’s mandatory provision are regarded as crucial for the safeguard of its crucial public
interests.
c) Art. 9 and other mechanisms for the application of mandatory provisions
33 Art. 9 refers to “overriding mandatory provisions”. It thus covers only those mandatory
provisions that, because of their “crucial” role for the safeguarding of a country’s public
interests, are applicable “irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract”.
34 Although it doesn’t use the term “overriding mandatory provisions”, Art. 11(6) of the
Regulation also implicitly refers to this kind of provisions. In particular, this rule imposes
compliance with the overriding mandatory provision of the lex rei sitae, which set formal
requirements for contracts concerning immovable property (rights in rem in or tenancy of
immovable property). Contrary to Art. 9, Art. 11(6) does not distinguish between provisions
of the lex fori and foreign provisions: the provisions of the lex rei sitae are declared appli-
cable, irrespective of the place of proceedings.
35 Arts. 3 (3), 3 (4), 6 (2) and 8 (1) of the Regulation refer to provisions “which cannot be
derogated from by agreement”. Contrary to Art. 9 and 16 (1), this reference encompasses all
mandatory provisions of a certain legal system, even if they do not have an “overriding”
reach and therefore do not fall under the definition of Art. 9 (1). As will be discussed later,
mandatory provisions form a broader category of norms, among which only some qualify as
overriding mandatory provisions. Therefore, if all mandatory provisions of a certain law are
applicable by virtue of a rule of the Regulation, this also covers overriding mandatory
provisions, so that recourse to Art. 9 is superfluous in that case.
36 The first of such rules, Art. 3 (3), corresponds to Art. 3 (3) Rome Convention. Pursuant to
this article, in contracts without cross-border elements, the parties’ choice of the applicable
law shall not prejudice the mandatory provision of the law of the only country with which
the contract is connected. The observance of overriding mandatory rules is also safeguarded
by this provision. In such a case, the parties’ choice can only derogate from the dispositive
rules of the otherwise applicable law, similar to that which occurs when the parties incor-
porate a foreign law into their contract.
37 Similarly, Art. 3(4), which is a “novelty” of the Regulation, ensures the application of the
mandatory provisions of European law notwithstanding the parties’ choice of the law of a
non-Member State, provided that all other elements relevant to the situation are located in
one or more Member States. In this case also, the reference to mandatory provisions of
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European law obviously includes overriding mandatory provisions of that legal system.
However, contrary to an isolated opinion, this does not mean that Art. 9 cannot be applied,
or is superfluous, with respect to European law provisions. It should be kept in mind that
Art. 3(4) only covers pure “intra-European” situations, i.e. contracts without any relevant
connection to a non-Member State. By contrast, if relevant elements of the situation are
located outside the European Union, only Art. 9 (and in particular Art. 9 (2)) can be relied
upon to ensure the application of overriding mandatory provisions of European law. This is,
for instance, the case in situations like the one which led to the Ingmar decision of the
European Court of Justice.33
38As already mentioned, Arts. 6 (2) and 8 (1) of the Regulation also refer to provisions which
cannot be derogated from by contract. Under these articles, the parties’ choice of the ap-
plicable law cannot deprive the consumer, respectively the employee, of the protection
afforded to him by the mandatory provision of the otherwise applicable law. Once again,
this reference also includes overriding mandatory provisions. However, as mentioned be-
fore, the concurrent application of Art. 9 is possible (although this does not occur very
frequently) for ensuring the application of those provisions which are not covered by Arts. 6
or 8, provided that these are regarded as crucial for safeguarding a country’s public interest.
d) Special choice-of-law rules in EU law instruments
39Pursuant to Art. 23, the Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of
Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules
relating to contractual obligations. By virtue of this provision, choice-of-law rules included
in European law acts prevail over the rules of the Regulation.
40As shown by the legislative history of Art. 23, this provision also covers the specific clauses,
included in several European directives in the area of consumer protection.34 Pursuant to
these clauses, the Member States have to take the necessary measures to ensure that the
parties’ choice of the law of a non-Member State as the law applicable to the contract cannot
deprive the consumer of the protection granted by the substantive rules of the relevant
directive, provided that the contract has a close connection with the territory of a Member
State. According to a widely held view, this “applicability rule”makes clear that the protec-
tive provisions in the EU directives are regarded, by the European legislator, as overriding
mandatory provisions having priority over the law chosen by the parties.35 Therefore, in the
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imposing, under certain circumstances, the mandatory application of the law of the country of origin:
Fallon/Meeusen, “Le commerce électronique, la directive 2000/31/CE et le droit international privé”,
RCDIP (2002), p. 486 et seq. On this questions see also Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–051 et seq.
35 Contra: Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 24.
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absence of Art. 23, the effect of such clauses would depend on Art. 9 of the Regulation. By
virtue of Art. 23, however, these clauses immediately prevail over the Regulation as a matter
of European law, so that recourse to Art. 9 is not needed.36
41 One might wonder whether Art. 23 also covers implied applicability rules of European law,
such as that announced by the European Court of Justice in its Ingmar decision. In that case,
it was held that Arts. 17 and 18 of the Directive on Commercial Agents could be relied upon
by a commercial agent domiciled in aMember State, irrespective of the parties’ choice of the
law of a non-Member State.37 The result of such case law is very similar to that of the internal
market clauses mentioned above. Notwithstanding this, it is submitted that Art. 23 only
covers explicit rules included in European law acts. Implied applicability rules such as that in
the Ingmar case require a thorough examination of the content and policy of the European
law rule at hand; for the sake of consistency with mandatory provisions of State law, such an
analysis should rest on the criteria set for overriding mandatory provisions by Art. 9 (1).
e) Art. 9 and public policy
42 Since overriding mandatory provisions prevail over bilateral choice-of-law rules when a
fundamental interest of the forum is at stake, they are functionally very similar to the
traditional ordre public exception, which is referred to in Art. 21 of the Regulation.
43 According to a widely held opinion, the difference between these two devices lays in the fact
that ordre public is only a defensive measure against the application of the foreign law
designated by the choice-of-law rules, whereas overriding provisions are to be “immediate-
ly” applied irrespective of the lex causae. The first operates (“as a shield”) after the governing
law has been selected, whereas the latter are applicable (“as a sword”) prior to selection of the
applicable law. However, this traditional understanding is challenged by the fact that the
application of overriding mandatory rules should not be blind, but should be based on a
weighing of policies, by which courts cannot ignore the content of the otherwise applicable
law.38
44 In practice, these two devices have similar effects, in particular because after the refusal of a
certain foreign law rule for public policy reasons, the resulting gap is frequently (although
not always) filled through the application of the lex fori. Furthermore, public policy is the
main tool by which non-compliance with an overriding mandatory provision can be sanc-
tioned at the stage of recognition and enforcement of a foreign decision.39
III. The Notion of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
1. The sources of overriding mandatory provisions
a) National law rules
45 Overriding mandatory provisions are often part of the national legal system of a country.
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This includes both the law in force in the whole of the country and the law applicable in one
or more territorial units, such as sister states in a federal system or regions. Of course, not
only written law rules, but also non-codified rules, such as customary law or case law rules,
can qualify as overriding provisions within the meaning of Art. 9 (1).40
46Because of the universal reach of the Regulation (Art. 2), Art. 9, and in particular its para-
graph 3, also encompasses the overriding mandatory provisions in force in a non-Member
State.
b) European law rules
47European law rules can also be qualified as internationally mandatory within themeaning of
Art. 9. This is widely accepted for rules included in EU directives as well as for the national
law rules implementing them.
48The case law of the European Court of Justice also confirms this. Thus, in the well-known
Ingmar case,41 the Court held that a commercial agent established in aMember State can rely
on Arts. 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive (and on the national transposition
rules) to claim an indemnity upon termination of the contract, even though the law chosen
by the parties as applicable to the contract is that of a non-Member State. Although the
Court did not use the expression “overriding mandatory provisions” nor any similar no-
tions, and did not refer to the (then applicable) Art. 7 Rome Convention, that decision is
generally interpreted as meaning that mandatory provisions included in EU directives (as
well as national transposition rules) are applicable irrespective of the otherwise applicable
law, provided that they can be regarded as crucial for safeguarding overriding European law
interests.
49This reading is corroborated by the Unamar decision of the European Court of Justice. In
this case, a similar question arose with respect to national (Belgian) transposition rules,
which had extended the scope of the Commercial Agents Directive, thus ensuring commer-
cial agents protection going beyond that provided by the directive. Contrary to the Ingmar
case, the law chosen by the parties was the law of a Member State that had implemented the
directive, meeting its minimum standard requirements. This time, the Court examined the
issue through the prism of Art. 7 (2) Rome Convention, and came to the conclusion that, in
those specific circumstances, the national transposition rules could only have priority over
the law chosen by the parties if the court seized found “on the basis of a detailed assessment,
that […] the legislature of the State of the forum held it to be crucial, in the legal order
concerned, to grant the commercial agent protection going beyond that provided for by that
directive, taking account in that regard of the nature and of the objective of such mandatory
provisions.” In other words, according to this decision, the seized court has to determine
whether the national transposition rules can be qualified as overriding mandatory provi-
sions in the case at hand.42
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(2001), p. 107, note Idot.
42 See already Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–048.
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50 According to a widely held (although not unanimous) opinion,43 the specific clause included
in several consumer law directives44 also have the effect of conferring on the relevant sub-
stantive rules the character of overridingmandatory provisions. However, reference to Art. 9
has become superfluous for such rules, since their application is now ensured by Art. 23 of
the Regulation.45
51 It has been held that recourse to Art. 9 is superfluous in order to ensure the application of
mandatory provisions of EU law which enjoy direct applicability, such as those included in
the EU treaties or in EU regulations. Following this opinion, the application of these rules
does not depend on their classification as overriding mandatory provisions, because they
have in any case priority over national law.46 This is certainly true when the law applicable to
the contract is the law of Member States: in this event, EU law provisions are directly
applicable to all situations falling within their scope and prevail over contrary national
law rules. However, the question is different when the law of a non-Member State governs
the contract by virtue of the EU Regulation. In this case, the priority of EU law rules cannot
be simply based on their direct applicability, but needs a legal basis under the Rome I
Regulation. As we have seen for directives, that legal basis will be Art. 23, when the EU
act contains a special choice-of-law rule within the meaning of that provision. Failing this,
the relevant EU rules can only prevail over the law applicable to the contract under the
conditions of Art. 9. This also means that not all EC law rules, albeit mandatory, can be
regarded as internationally mandatory.
c) International law
52 Overriding mandatory provisions can also have their sources in public international law, in
particular in international treaties and in the acts of international organisations. Trade
embargoes or other personal or economic sanctions adopted by the United Nations are a
good example for that. The rules included in these acts are obviously applicable when they
are in force (as self-executing provisions or by virtue of a transposition into national law) in
the country, the law of which governs the contract under the Regulation. They can also
prevail over the law otherwise applicable provided that they meet the conditions of Art. 9.
2. The definition of overriding mandatory provisions and its impact
53 A definition of overriding mandatory provisions was introduced in Art. 9 (1) of the Regu-
lation, following the European Commission’s proposal.47 Pursuant to the new text, over-
riding mandatory provisions are “provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic orga-
nisation, to such extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope,
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract” under the Regulation.
54 The introduction of a normative definition of this category of legal provisions no doubt
constitutes an important innovation compared with Art. 7 Rome Convention. This defini-
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44 See supra, Art. 9 para. 40.
45 Magnus, para. 37.
46 Magnus, para. 37; Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 28.
47 See Art. 8 (1) of the Proposal.
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tion is also unique from a comparative law perspective; indeed, to the best of our knowledge,
no other text – national or international – contains such a detailed definition of overriding
mandatory provisions.
55As regards its content, the definition is not particularly innovative. Its direct source is to be
found in the well-known Arblade decision of the European Court of Justice.48 It should be
recalled, however, that, in that decision, the European Court of Justice did not intend to
create its own notion of overriding mandatory provisions (the question posed by the Belgian
court did not require the Court to do so) and restricted itself to confirming the principle –
clear, in and of itself – that Community law takes precedence over internal law, including
those national norms which, in their own legal system, are regarded as overriding manda-
tory provisions.49 Thus, the definition of lois de police endorsed by the Court was no other
that that used in Belgian law. In turn, this definition stems from French legal doctrine, in
particular from the writings of Phocion Francescakis on “lois d’application immediate”.50
56Although the doctrinal and jurisprudential origins of the definition appear unequivocal, the
consequences of its inclusion into the Regulation are more controversial.
57The definition certainly has the beneficial effect of clarifying the meaning of overriding
mandatory provisions. On this point, the Rome Conventionmaintained a certain ambiguity
between the notion of lois de police and that of mandatory rules. Indeed, the expression
“mandatory rules” was used with different meanings in various provisions of the Conven-
tion. Whereas pursuant to Arts. 3 (3) (contracts having no cross-border elements), 5 (2)
(consumers contracts) and 6 (1) (employment contracts), this term referred to all the rules
“which cannot be derogated from by contract”, the same term was used in the title of Art. 7
Andrea Bonomi 617
Chapter II: Uniform Rules Article 9
48 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 and C-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453, para. 30, where it was held that the terms “lois de
police et de sûreté” as used in Belgian law should be understood “as applying to national provisions
compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or
economic order in theMember State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present
on the national territory of thatMember State and all legal relationshipswithin that State.” See the note by
Fallon in RCDIP (2000), p. 710. However, this definition was notmentioned in theMazzoleni case, which
also concerned the conformity with EU law of Belgian rules on the protection of workers: Procédure
pénale contre André Mazzoleni et Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL (case C-165/98) (2001), ECR 2001,
p. I-2189, para. 22 et seq.; RCDIP (2001), p. 495, with note by Pataut.
49 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 andC-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453, para. 31: ‘the fact that national rules are categorised
as public-order legislation [lois de police] does not mean that they are exempt from compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty; if it did, the primacy and uniform application of Community law would be
undermined. The considerations underlying such national legislation can be taken into account by
Community law only in terms of the exceptions to Community freedoms expressly provided for by
the Treaty and, where appropriate, on the ground that they constitute overriding reasons relating to the
public interest’. This aspect of the Arblade case is rightly emphasised by P. Mankowski (note 1), p. 109.
50 Francescakis, Quelques précisions sur les ‘lois d’application immédiate’ et leurs rapports avec les règles
sur les conflits de lois, RCDIP (1966), p. 1 et seq.; Francescakis, Lois d’application immédiate et règles de
conflit, RCDIP (1967), p. 691 et seq.; Francescakis, Conflits de lois (principes généraux), in: Rép. Dalloz,
Droit international, t. 1 (1968), p. 480.
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with respect to those rules which are now called “overriding mandatory provisions”, i.e. a
more restricted category of mandatory legal provisions that are to be applied “irrespective of
the law otherwise applicable to the contract.” Such ambiguous language did not facilitate the
understanding of the system, in particular for legal practitioners not specialised in private
international law. The difficulty became much more serious in the Contracting States that
did not recognise the notion of lois de police in their internal law.51 The definition introduced
in the Regulation clarifies that overriding mandatory provisions form a sub-set of the more
general category of mandatory rules. To prevent all ambiguity, the drafter of the new text
also preferred to avoid the term “mandatory rules” in other provisions of the Regulation; this
is the reason why Arts. 3 (3), 3(4), 6 (2) and 8 (1) of the Regulation now only refer to rules
“which cannot be derogated from by contract”. The need to clearly distinguish between
these two notions is also expressed in Recital 37, where it is stated that “[t]he concept of
‘overriding mandatory provisions’ should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions
which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ and should be construedmore restrictively.”
To this purpose, the new definition is certainly useful.
58 The definition, which is formulated in terms that are deliberately restrictive, should also
have a dissuasive effect for theMember States. The reference to norms deemed to be “crucial”
for the safeguard of “public interests” as well as maintaining the “political, social and eco-
nomic organisation” of the State, is clearly meant to prevent national legislators and courts
from conferring too easily an overriding character to domestic mandatory rules. This should
prevent a too frequent derogation from the uniform choice-of-law rules of the Regulation by
means of excessive recourse to Art. 9.52 This concern is clearly demonstrated by Recital 37
which emphasises that recourse to overriding mandatory provisions, as well as to public
policy, should only be possible in “exceptional circumstances” and that this notion should be
“construed more restrictively” than that of internal mandatory rules. The normative defi-
nition will certainly result in the courts of Member States being required to provide appro-
priate reasoned justification of their decision to qualify a domestic provision as a loi de
police.53
59 The definition in Art. 9 (1) should also promote a more uniform application of the Regu-
lation. Indeed, this definition reflects a new European law notion of overriding mandatory
provisions, an autonomous notion which is distinct from those which may exist in the
Member States (although it is certainly intended to influence them) and should be construed
accordingly. Of course, States remain free to determine whether a provision should be
regarded as crucial for safeguarding their own interests: this decision can be taken either
by the national legislators or, failing an express indication, by the national courts. However,
as is nowwidely accepted with respect to public policy,54 EU law fixes the limits within which
618 August 2016
Article 9 Rome I Regulation
51 The problem arose particularly in the common law countries, where the entry into force of the Rome
Convention led the doctrine to forge a new concept, that of “overriding statutes”, as opposed to “simple”
mandatory norms (“mandatory rules”). See Harris, p. 297 et seq.
52 Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15), para. 43 et seq.
53 Such a justification should specify that themandatory norm pursues an objective essential to the enacting
State and that its application to the case at hand is necessary for the realisation of this result. See infra,
Art. 9 para. 85.
54 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, (case C-7/98) (2000), ECR 2000-I, p. 1935, para. 23; Marco
Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company (case C-394/07) (2009),
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the Member States may legitimately have recourse to the concept of overriding mandatory
provisions, and provides an indication of “the interests which a country can legitimately take
into account in determining whether a rule is overriding.”55 Also, the existence of a Euro-
pean law notion necessarily implies that the Court of Justice is competent to interpret it.56
Therefore, the inclusion of this definition in the Regulation has an impact that goes well
beyond the Arblade decision where the Court of Justice, as we have noted, did not intend to
formulate a general definition of overriding mandatory provisions.
3. The elements of the definition
60According to Art. 9 (1), for a rule to qualify as an overriding mandatory rule, three condi-
tions must be satisfied: a) the provision should be mandatory; b) its observance should be
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political,
social or economic organization; c) the provision should be applicable irrespective of the law
that otherwise governs the contract under the Regulation. These conditions are cumulative,
i.e. they all need to be fulfilled.57 All these elements can be expressly stated by the provision
or can be inferred from it by way of construction.
61The classification of the provision as a part of private or public law is not relevant.58 How-
ever, for the application of Art. 9, it is necessary that the provision has an effect on a contract
or on the rights or obligation arising thereof.
a) A mandatory provision
62As it clearly results from the language of Art. 9 (1) as well as from the title of this article, only
“mandatory provisions”, i.e. rules that cannot be derogated from by party agreement, belong
to this particular category of lois de police. This is now quite generally accepted. The reason is
self-evident: if a rule of law can be excluded or derogated from by contract, it can hardly be
regarded as the expression of a fundamental policy of the forum. Therefore, there is no
reason why it should prevail over the law applicable to the contract, designated by the
ordinary choice-of-law rules.
63It is not always easy to establish whether a rule of law is mandatory or not. In some cases, this
is clearly stated by an express provision. Failing such an indication, it is a matter of con-
struction and interpretation, which has to be decided under domestic law (or EU law, or
international law), by examining the content of the rule and its underlying policy.59
64Since the mandatory nature is not sufficient to classify a rule as an overriding provision, the
examination of the other requirements set up by Art. 9 (1) will often absorb the specific
question of the mandatory nature; in other words, if a rule is regarded as “crucial for safe-
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55 See Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–013.
56 See infra, Art. 9 para. 97 et seq.
57 Magnus, para. 46.
58 Martiny, Münchener Kommentar, para. 12.
59 See United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, (Case C-184/12)
(2013), para. 50.
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guarding the public interests” of a country, it is normally clear that it cannot be derogated
from by contract. Conversely, if it is accepted under domestic law that a specific provision is
not mandatory (because it can be derogated from by party agreement), this will be sufficient
to reject its overriding character.
65 As already mentioned, not all mandatory provisions belong to the restricted category of
overriding mandatory provisions; in other words, not all mandatory rules command their
application irrespective of the law designated by the choice-of-law rules. As a matter of
principle, choice-of-law rules prevail over domestic rules, even if the latter are mandatory.
Thus, when the contract is governed by the law of a foreign country, the rules of the lex fori
will be discarded, even if they are mandatory.
66 Normally, the same is true evenwhen the governing lawwas selected by the parties, as widely
permitted by Art. 3 of the Regulation. Thus, when the parties have chosen the law applicable
to the contract, their choice excludes all rules of the otherwise applicable law (i.e. of the law
which would have been applicable in the absence of a choice), including its mandatory rules.
Under the Regulation, there are only few exceptions to this general principle. One of these is
Art. 3 (3) of the Regulation, pursuant to which all mandatory rules of the otherwise appli-
cable law prevail over the law designated by the parties, if the contract has no genuine cross-
border element (i.e. if it is a purely “domestic” contract). Similarly, in intra-European
relationships the mandatory rules of EU law prevail over the parties’ choice by virtue of
Art. 3(4). Finally, under Arts. 6 (2) and 8 (1) of the Regulation, the parties’ choice in a
consumer or employment contract cannot deprive the weaker party of the protection af-
forded to him by themandatory rules of the lawwhich would be applicable to the contract in
the absence of choice.
67 Subject to these few exceptions (and to the “classical” public policy clause of Art. 21), only
overriding mandatory provisions take priority over the choice-of-law rules. Therefore, as
stated in Recital 37, a clear distinction should be drawn between “domestically mandatory”
(or “internally mandatory”) provisions, which cannot be derogated from by agreement, on
one side, and “overriding mandatory” (or “internationally mandatory”) provisions, on the
other.
b) A provision, the respect for which is crucial for safeguarding public interests
68 According to the definition in Art. 9 (1), overriding mandatory provisions are, “provisions
the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests,
such as its political, social or economic organisation.” The purpose of this language is to
clarify how overriding mandatory provisions should be distinguished from simply “domes-
tically” mandatory provisions and why they have to be applied in cross-border situations
irrespective of the otherwise applicable law.60 As the language of Art. 9 (1) makes clear, only
an overriding mandatory provision involves the “crucial” interests of a country and must
therefore be observed, even if in derogation from the law applicable pursuant to the ordinary
choice-of-law rules.
69 The assessment of these conditions is a matter for the court, in conformity with the criteria
which might be formulated by the European Court of Justice. It is very unlikely that these
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elements directly result from the wording of the provision. Therefore, the court will have to
make a “detailed assessment”, based on the “general structure” of the provision and on “all
the circumstances in which that law was adopted”.61 The fact that a rule is provided with a
specific definition of its territorial or personal scope is, of course, a strong indication that it
could amount to an overriding mandatory provision. The sanctions provided for in case of
non-observance are also important: thus, the fact that the rule is enforced by way of criminal
or administrative sanctions can be an important element. However, civil law sanctions, such
as the nullity or enforceability of the contract or liability for damages, may also be signifi-
cant.
70According to the language of Art. 9 (1), only the safeguard of a country’s “public interests”
can justify a derogation from the ordinary choice-of-law rules. In particular, these interests
could involve the political, social or economic organisation of that country.
71Based on this, there is no doubt that Art. 9 covers provisions, whether of public or private
law, directly aimed at the protection of collective interests of a country, provided that they
are regarded as crucial to that purpose. This is typically the case of anti-trust legislation and
rules against unreasonable restraint of trade, commercial embargoes and other political or
economic sanctions against foreign countries, rules on the import and export of goods and
services, provisions on the access and the exercise of specific trades or professions, regula-
tions on stock exchanges and other public markets, regulations on prices and fees (e.g. rules
against champerty), legislation on exchange control or restricting credit in the interest of
currency stability, and so on. All of these rules are not concerned with the protection of the
individual interests of a contractual party, but are directly aimed to safeguard the overriding
public interests of a country (or, as the case may be, of a supranational organization or a
group of countries).
72Typically, these rules do not have an exact equivalent in the law of foreign countries, because
their foreign counterpart – when they exist – usually target the protection of the foreign
country’s interests and therefore have a different spatial or personal scope. Thus, only their
mandatory application, irrespective of the otherwise governing law, ensures, in international
situations, the safeguard of the protected interests. This is, for instance, the case for anti-trust
legislation; the foreign country, the law of which can be chosen by the parties, may well have
enacted its own anti-trust rules, but these normally have a different scope, because their aim
is the protection of the foreign country’s market. Only the application of the anti-trust rules
in force in the forum ensures the protection of the forum’s overriding interests.
73By contrast, it is highly debatable whether Art. 9 also covers mandatory rules that are
designed to protect certain categories of individuals, in particular weaker parties, such as
consumers, employees, tenants, commercial agents, franchisees, etc.
74Norms of this kind are meant to directly protect the private interests of a party. Notwith-
standing this, there is a widely held opinion that considers that they may be assimilated to
the category of overriding mandatory provisions, at least when they also protect, in an
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indirect manner, interests of a public nature.62 This idea is particularly strong in some
Member States, such as France,63 Italy64 and Belgium.65 Under the Rome Convention, this
opinion was corroborated by the plain language of the explanatory report66 mentioning the
rules on consumer protection as well as those relating to carriage contracts as possible
examples of lois de police within the scope of Art. 7. Apparently, the European Court of
Justice also took the same position in the Ingmar case, holding that some protective provi-
sions of the Commercial Agents Directive could prevail over the law of a non-Member State
chosen by the parties.67
75 However, according to a different opinion, a clear distinction should be made between the
mandatory norms pursuing public goals and those protecting individual interests. Thus,
most German scholars distinguish between Eingriffsnormen, on one hand, and Parteischutz-
vorschriften (or Sonderprivatrecht, i.e. “special private law”), on the other. The norms of the
first category “interfere” (“eingreifen”) with the traditional contract law rules in order to
further goals of public interest.68 This is, for instance, the case of the anti-trust legislation and
of the rules governing imports and exports of goods. These rules clearly pursue collective
interests and not only those of the parties to the contract. By contrast, with respect to the
norms of the second category, their mandatory nature serves to preserve (or re-establish) a
balance between the parties to the contract (the expression Ausgleich privater Interessen is
used in Germany): typical examples are the rules protecting consumers and employees.
Several German scholars argue that only Eingriffsnormen should be qualified as overriding
mandatory provisions.69 This scholarly view has largely influenced German courts: as early
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62 An example is provided by the decisions rendered by the French Cour de cassation which attributed the
nature of lois de police to the rules providing the sub-contractor with a the direct action against the owner
(a particularity of French law provided for by a law of 31.12.1975): Cass, Ch. mixte, 30.11.2007, Agintis,
Juris-Classeur PériodiqueG 2008, II, 10000, noteD’Avout; Clunet 2008, note Perreau-Saussine; Cass. Ch.
com., 27.4.2011, RCDIP (2011), p. 624, noteM.-E. Ancel. Even though this rule certainly has an indirect
effect on competition, it is intended to protect, at least in the first instance, the individual interests of a
category of (often small) entrepreneurs. A different conclusion was arrived at by Cass. com. 13.7.2010,
Clunet (2011), p. 91, note Jault-Seseke, with reference to the direct action of the carrier of goods (Art.
L.132–8 of the Code de commerce).
63 See the decisions of the French Cour de cassation of 23.5.2006, Dalloz (2006), p. 2798 (concerning
consumer law) and those of 30.11.2007 and 27.4.2011 (quoted in the previous footnote) The French
doctrine refers in such cases to lois de police ‘de protection’ as opposed to lois de police ‘de direction’. See
also Boskovic, Dalloz (2008), p. 2178. Kuipers/Migliorini ERPL (2011), p. 195.
64 See Pocar, La protection de la partie faible en droit international privé, in: Recueil des cours, t. 188, 1984,
V, p. 392 et seq.; Pocar, La legge applicabile ai contratti con i consumatori, in: Treves (ed.), Verso una
disciplina comunitaria della legge applicabile ai contratti, Padua 1983, p. 314 et seq.; Bonomi, Le norme
imperative (1998), p. 190; Boschiero, p. 111.
65 Thus, the Belgian provisions protecting commercial agents and exclusive distributors are traditionally
regarded as lois de police: seeNuyts RCDIP (1999), p. 31–74. Overriding provisions also exist in the field
of consumer and workers protection, as illustrated by the Arblade and Mazzoleni cases.
66 Report by Giuliano/Lagarde, p. 28.
67 Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., (C-381–98) (2000), ECR 2000-I, p. 9305; RCDIP
(2001), p. 107, note Idot.
68 On the differences between the German and the French approaches, see also Kuipers/Migliorini ERPL
(2011), p. 189 et seq.
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as the first half of the 1990’s, the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), relying on this
restrictive reading of Art. 7 (2) Rome Convention (more precisely, of the German rule
implementing that provision, Art. 34 (2) EGBGB), refused to apply a number of German
rules protecting employees against abusive dismissal.70 In a more recent judgment, and after
having left the question open in some previous decisions,71 the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) held that the norms protecting certain categories of individuals, in
particular the weaker party to a contract, do not fall under Art. 34 (2) EGBGB, even when
they also tend to promote, indirectly, collective interests (“Belange der Allgemeinheit reflex-
artig mitgeschützt werden”).72
76Although Art. 9 (1) refers to the safeguarding of public interests, several elements of its
wording indicate that this provision should not be construed as implying an a priori exclu-
sion from its scope of all norms aimed at the protection of individual interests.73
77First of all, it is important to note that such a restrictive reading does not necessarily follow
from the wording of Art. 9 (1). As it was frequently pointed out, norms protecting specific
categories of individuals can also have a crucial importance for a country’s political, social
and economic organisation, and thus indirectly further its public interests.74 It therefore
follows from the Ingmar decision that, although the immediate purpose of Arts. 17 and 18 of
the Commercial Agents Directive is the protection of commercial agents as weaker parties,
the objective of these provisions is, at the same time, to promote some fundamental goals of
EU law such as freedom of establishment and unrestricted competition.75 Some national
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references see Bonomi, Le norme imperative (1998), p. 172 et seq.
70 Bundesarbeitsgericht, 29 October 1992, in: IPRax 1994, p. 123, pursuant to whose terms § 613a BGB, that
protects the rights of employees in the event of a sale of a company, does not have an international
mandatory character. See Bonomi, Le norme imperative (1998), p. 174, and the references therein.
71 Cf. the judgments of 26.10.1993, in: IPRax 1994, p. 449, and of 19.3.1997, published in French in RCDIP
(1998), p. 610, with note by Lagarde.
72 Bundesgerichtshof, 13.12.2005, in: IPRax (2006), p. 272, with the commentary of Th. Pfeiffer, p. 238 et
seq.; see also Bundesgerichtshof, 9.7.2009, EuZW (2009), p. 907, para. 32 (concerning the rules on
standard terms included in §§ 307–309 BGB).
73 Boschiero, p. 111 et seq.; Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 112; Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 458; Nuyts RDC (2009),
p. 559; Pfeiffer EuZW (2008), p. 628, note 45; Remien, in: Festschrift für Bernd von Hoffmann (2011),
p. 336; Stone, EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. (2010), p. 342; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9
Rom I-VO, para. 11. See also the opinion of Advocate GeneralWahl in the caseUnamar (Case C-184/12),
paras. 53 et seq. For a narrow reading of Art. 9: Archer EJCL (2009), p. 701; D’Avout Rec. Dalloz (2008),
p. 2167; Garcimartín Alférez, ELF (2008), p. I-16; Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 15.
74 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 11. According to Nuyts RDC (2009), p. 558, the
reference to “public interests” is larger than that to the organisation of the State.
75 In order to justify the overriding reach of the rules of the Directive, the ECJ stressed that they were
intended “to eliminate restrictions on the carrying-on of the activities of commercial agents, to make the
conditions of competition within the Community uniform and to increase the security of commercial
transactions”, and that their purpose was “to protect, for all commercial agents, freedom of establishment
and the operation of undistorted competition in the internal market.”: Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard
Technologies Inc., (C-381–98) (2000), ECR 2000-I, p. 9305, para. 29.
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decisions on the issue also confirm this.76 That being so, a literal understanding of Art. 9 (1)
cannot lead to the exclusion a priori of all of “protective” rules from the category of over-
riding mandatory provisions.77
78 The legislative history of Art. 9 also indicates that such a narrow understanding of overriding
mandatory provisions has not been sought by the drafters of the Regulation. The definition
was already included, withmore or less the same language, in the Commission Proposal.78 In
this respect, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal simply stated that
the definition originated from the Arblade decision, but did not mention the intention of
changing the current understanding of lois de police. Admittedly, one of the objectives of the
definition was to discourage a too frequent recourse to this notion by theMember States, but
nothing indicated that the Commission intended to rule out from the scope of the provision
the whole category of rules protecting individuals. There is also no indication that the
distinction between Eingriffsnormen and Parteischutzvorschriften was discussed in the sub-
sequent stages of the legislative procedure.79 Both in the Council and in the European
Parliament, the debate focused on the very controversial issue of foreign overriding provi-
sions and on the drafting of what becameArt. 9 (3). Given that the notion of lois de policewas
interpreted quite widely under the Rome Convention – as it clearly appears from the Ex-
planatory Report and from the case law in at least someContracting States – it cannot be that
a fundamental change of approach would have been brought about covertly, without any
open debate on the issue. At the very least, more explicit language would have been needed
for that purpose.
79 A significant argument in the same vein can also be inferred from the Arblade case itself,
which is the direct antecedent of the Art. 9 (1) definition.80 Onemust not lose sight of the fact
that, in that case, as in the followingMazzoleni case, the Court of Justice used the notion of
overriding mandatory provisions with regard to national norms of employees’ protection. It
would be extremely surprising if the language taken from the Court’s ruling were to be read
as excluding norms protecting employees and other weaker parties.
80 Inmore general terms, a narrow interpretation would be at odds with the alreadymentioned
tendency of the European legislator to confer an overriding reach on norms that protect the
weaker party. This is the case for several directives on consumer protection which contain a
specific clause, aimed at ensuring the priority of the substantive rules on the parties’ choice
of the law of non-Member State.81 In the Posting ofWorkers Directive, an overriding effect is
attributed also to certain national rules on workers’ protection which are in force in the
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76 So the decision of the French Cour de cassation of 30.11.2007, quoted above.
77 This is implicitly recognised by one of the principal proponents of the interpretation of overriding
mandatory provisions as Eingriffsnormen, Mankowski IPRax (2006), p. 109, who deplored the fact that,
in the definition included in Art. 8 (1) of the Proposal “[d]ie Dichotomie Ausgleich zwischen Vertrags-
parteien/überindividuelle Interessen taucht als solche bedauerlicherweise nirgends auf.” See alsoKuipers/
Migliorini ERPL (2011), 201.
78 Art. 8 (1) of the Proposal.
79 See also Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 11.
80 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade &/Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 and C-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453.
81 See supra note 30.
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Member State where the worker is posted.82 This legislative tendency is also corroborated by
the case law of the European Court of Justice. In the previously cited Ingmar decision, the
Court implicitly recognised the nature of overriding mandatory provisions of the norms
protecting commercial agents.83 In the same vein, in the Mostaza Claro case,84 the Court
regarded the consumer protection rules of the Unfair Terms Directive as belonging to the
European public policy. Certainly, this trend mainly (but not only) concerns norms belong-
ing to European law, the application of which is now often (but not always) ensured by the
new Art. 23 of the Regulation. However, it would be strange if the Court adopted a radically
different approach with respect to the protective provisions in force in the Member States.
81Finally, it should be noted that, if the German distinction between Eingriffsnormen and
Parteischutzvorschriften were adopted for the purpose of Art. 9 (1), its impact would be
stronger than under current German law. In that Member State, the distinction serves as a
limit for the courts when the overriding nature of a provision does not result clearly from its
wording. By contrast, if such a distinction were adopted for the purpose of the Regulation, it
would also limit the autonomy of the Member States’ legislators, because they could no
longer confer an overriding reach on internal norms protecting individuals.85 It is unlikely
that the European legislator intended to restrain the power of the Member States to deter-
mine their own crucial interests to such a large extent.
82For all of these reasons, it is submitted that rules aimed at the protection of individual
interests can also qualify as overriding mandatory provisions. Of course, this is only a
possibility and does not mean that all rules of this kind have an overriding effect.86 It would
certainly be wrong to assume that all protective rules are internationally mandatory; how-
ever, it cannot be excluded a priori that some of them belong to this category. As Art. 9 (1)
makes clear, a mandatory rule can prevail over the ordinary choice-of-law rules only when it
is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests. Thismeans that a rule
protecting individuals can only be regarded as lois de police when it also promotes public
interests: in other words, the rule must have a dual ormultiple purpose.87 The decisions cited
above offer some examples of this.
83As a consequence of the suggested interpretation, Art. 9 can be invoked by the weaker party
to a contract in order to seek protection of mandatory rules of national law, provided that
these rules are crucial for safeguarding a country’s public interests. As stated above, this
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82 We refer here to certain protective norms of the State to which an employee is posted, to which the
Directive 96/71/EC77 attributes the nature of overriding mandatory provisions.
83 Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., (C-381–98) (2000), ECR 2000-I, p. 9305.
84 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL (case C-168/05) (2006), ECR, 2006-I, p. 10421;
Rev. arb. (2007), p. 199, note Idot, in which the Court affirms that the rules of Directive 93/13/EEC
concerning unfair contract terms are a part of the European public policy. See also Asturcom Comuni-
caciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Noguera, (case C-40/08) (2009), ECR, 2009-I, p. 9579.
85 See Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 12.
86 Nuyts RDC (2009), p. 560.
87 Also Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 459; Remien, in: Festschrift für Bernd von Hoffmann (2011), p. 336 et seq.;
Renner, in: Calliess, Art. 9 Rome I, para. 20; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 11.
However, it is not necessary that the protection of a public interest is paramount, as suggested byMagnus,
para. 59 et seq., and Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 13.
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possibility also exists in the areas covered by the special choice-of-law rules of Arts. 6 and 8
of the Regulation (i.e. consumer and employment contracts); however, in these areas the
conditions for the concurrent application of Art. 9 are rarely satisfied. By contrast, the effects
of the proposed, broad understanding of Art. 9 are more important for the protection of
those weaker parties, who are not benefitting from the special choice-of-law rules of the
Regulation, in particular in those areas where an unrestricted party choice of the applicable
law is permitted. This is the case, inter alia, for rental agreements, carriage of goods and
persons, insurance, distribution (agency and exclusive distribution contracts) and other
commercial transactions involving SME.
84 Although Art. 9 (1) does not clearly state it, only important public interests can justify
recourse to Art. 9.88 This results from the reference to a country’s political, social or eco-
nomic “organization”: not all public interests are so important that they can be regarded as
having an impact on a country’s organization. Recital 37 also stresses that the application of
overriding mandatory provisions is possible only “in exceptional circumstances” and that
this concept should be construed “restrictively”.89
85 Furthermore, the language of Art. 9 (1) makes clear that the provision in question must be
“crucial” for safeguarding the interests at stake. This implies that the application of the
provision in the case at hand is not only necessary but is also the most effective way of
promoting the underlying policy. This opens the door to a proportionality test.90 Thus, if the
country’s public interest can be (sufficiently or even better) satisfied through the application
of the law governing the contract, the court seized should refrain from resorting to Art. 9.
This reasoning also has a significant consequence from a methodological point of view:
contrary to traditional understanding, overriding mandatory provisions do not operate
“blindly”, but should take into account the content of the law otherwise applicable to the
contract.
c) A provision with an overriding reach
86 The third element of the definition in Art. 9 (1) reflects the traditional understanding of
overriding mandatory rules. Because of their particular purpose and content, these rules
derogate from the ordinary choice-of-law rules and demand to be applied to all situations
falling within their scope, “irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under
this Regulation”. The term “overriding”, which is now commonly used in legal English to
qualify these provisions, refers to their ability to derogate from the ordinary choice-of-law
rules. The same idea is present in the expressions used for these provisions in other lan-
guages (e.g. “norme di applicazione necessaria”, i.e. “norms of necessary application” in
Italian).
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88 Magnus, para. 61.
89 See alsoUnited AntwerpMaritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. NavigationMaritime Bulgare, (Case C-184/
12) (2013), para. 49, where the Court held that “[…] to give full effect to the principle of the freedom of
contract of the parties to a contract, […] the plea relating to the existence of a ‘mandatory rule’within the
meaning of the legislation of the Member State concerned, as referred to in Art. 7 (2) of [the Rome]
Convention, must be interpreted strictly.” In the same sense see now also Republik Griechenland v.
Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15), para. 43 et seq.
90 See Bonomi, Le norme imperative (1999), p. 219 et seq.; Bonomi YPIL (1999) p. 89 et seq.
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87In some instances, the overriding reach of a provision expressly results from its wording, or
from the wording of other rules having the purpose of defining its scope of application.91
However, this is not very frequent. More commonly, a provision is simply accompanied by
an express delimitation of its (territorial or personal) scope. Where the criterion adopted for
this purpose does not coincide with that used by the ordinary choice-of-law rules in the
relevant field, this is an indication that, in accordance with the intention of the legislator,
that specific provision should be observed “irrespective of the otherwise applicable law”.
Thus, when the national anti-trust law provisions are expressly declared to be applicable to
all conduct having an effect on a country’s market,92 they will affect all transactions having
such an effect, even if they are governed by a foreign law. However, this is not necessarily the
case. An express definition of a provision’s scope does not necessarily mean that that provi-
sion is not subject to the ordinary choice-of-law rules. In fact, it may be the case that the
provision is subject to a double limitation (that resulting on the ordinary choice-if-law rules
and that based on its own scope); then, it does not have an overriding reach. These rules have
been referred to as “self-limited” rules or “inherent limitations in statutes”.93
88Under Art. 7 (2) Rome Convention, the overriding reach was the only element expressly
referred to as characterising a loi de police. In that framework, the fact that a provision was
conferred an overriding reach by the legislator or by the courts could legitimately be re-
garded as sufficient for qualifying that provision as an overridingmandatory rule. Therefore,
subject to the inherent limitations of European law,94 Member States’ legislators and courts
were free to confer an overriding reach on their internal provisions and thus derogate from
the choice-of-law rules of the Convention. This has changed with the definition in Art. 9 (1).
The overriding reach has ceased to be a self-sufficient condition for a loi de police and is now
to be regarded rather as the consequence of the other conditions, in particular of a norm
being crucial for safeguarding a country’s public interests. Failing this, a provision cannot
override the choice-of-law rules of the Regulation.
89At least in theory, this means that when a rule does not reflect a crucial interest of the
country, the national courts could (and should!) refuse its application based onArt. 9, even if
that rule is expressly provided with an overriding effect.95 Admittedly, in practice, an express
indication of the provision’s scope and/or of its overriding character will continue to be
interpreted by the courts as meaning that the rule is crucial for a country’s public interests.96
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91 A typical example is the clause included in several consumer law directives, pursuant to which the
substantive provisions of the relevant directive are to be applied irrespective of the party choice of the
law of a non-Member State. See supra, note 30.
92 See for instance § 130 (2) of the German statute against restrictions of competition (GWB) or Art. 2 (2) of
the Swiss anti-trust statute.
93 Hay, Comments on “Self-Limited Rules of Law” in Conflicts Methodology, AJCL (1982), p. 281 et seq.;
Lipstein, Inherent Limitations in Statutes and the Conflict of Laws, ICLQ (1977), p. 884 et seq.
94 See infra, Art. 9 para. 91 et seq.
95 Harris, p. 296 (“[…] an English court could refuse to apply its own law under Art. 9 (2), even in
circumstances where the UKParliament has clearly stated that is to be applied regardless of the governing
law”). According to Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 460, “this would be unfortunate.”
96 Nuyts RDC (2009), p. 560; Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–007. According to these scholars, the fact that a
rule expressly states its overriding reach is to be regarded as “strong prima facie evidence that respect of
the rule was indeed regarded by a country as crucial to its public interests.”
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However, the European Court of Justice can now prevent an excessive use of Art. 9 by
dictating more specific criteria for the “public interests-test” under Art. 9 (1).
90 In the majority of cases, mandatory provisions do not include an express statement as to
their overriding reach, nor an express definition of their scope. In such instances, the task of
determining a provision’s scope and of stating, where appropriate, its overriding reach, rests
entirely with the courts, which will have to, for this purpose, scrutinise the provision’s
content and objectives.97
4. Other unwritten conditions
a) Compatibility with EU law and public international law
91 Overriding mandatory provisions in force in the law of a Member State are obviously to be
treated, from the point of view of EC law, as all others national measures. As made clear by
the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Arblade case,98 the characterization of
national provisions as lois de police, “does not mean that they are exempt from compliance
with the provisions of the Treaty.”99 Thus, although these provisions aim at safeguarding
crucial interests of a Member State, they can only derogate from the fundamental freedoms
under the very narrow conditions allowed by EU law. In particular,
‘the considerations underlying such national legislation can be taken into account by Com-
munity law only in terms of the exceptions to Community freedoms expressly provided for
by the Treaty and, where appropriate, on the ground that they constitute overriding reasons
relating to the public interest.’100
92 Moreover, the national mandatory provisions will have to comply with the principle of
proportionality, i.e., “they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective
which they pursue, and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”101
93 This is nothing new from a theoretical point of view. Since EC law prevails over the domestic
law of the Member States, it is simply logical that it should also prevail over those national
rules which pursue fundamental interests of the State concerned. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the definition of overriding mandatory provisions in Art. 9 has the effect of
introducing a new test of compliance, which is distinct and logically prior to that of the
compatibility of overriding mandatory norms with the principles of European law. The two
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97 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, (Case C-184/12)
(2013), para. 50.
98 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 and C-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453, para. 30. See also Procédure pénale contre André
Mazzoleni et Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL (case C-165/98) (2001), ECR 2001, p. I-2189, para. 22 et
seq.
99 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 and C-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453, para. 31.
100 Jean-Claude Arblade, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup et Sofrage SARL (cases
C-369/96 and C-376/96) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 8453, para. 31.
101 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam contre Inspire Art Ltd., (case C-167/01) (2003),
ECR 2003-I, p. 10155, para. 133.
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tests have a different purpose (compliance with the definition of overriding mandatory
provisions on one hand, conformity with EU law on the other) and scope (intra-EU cases
or also cases involving third States). However, they are based on similar criteria (overriding
interests, proportionality) and will therefore overlap to a certain extent.
94It is also obvious that overriding mandatory provisions must furthermore respect public
international law rules and principles, insofar as these are binding and applicable under the
general principles.102
b) A connection with the enacting State (“Inlandsbeziehung”)
95Because of the similarity between overriding mandatory provisions and public policy, one
can wonder whether the former are, as with the latter, also subject to the condition that the
situation presents a connection to the State that has enacted them (“Inlandsbeziehung” in
the German terminology). Such a connection was required by Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention
as a condition for giving effect to foreign lois de police; for the same purpose, a narrower
condition is now set by Art. 9 (3), which allows only overriding mandatory provisions that
are in force at the place of performance to be applied. By contrast, no such condition is
mentioned in the first two paragraphs of Art. 9.
96Notwithstanding the lack of an express reference to such condition, it is submitted that a
close connection is implicitly required for the purpose of Art. 9.103 This follows from the
condition, established by Art. 9 (1), that an overriding mandatory provision is to be, “re-
garded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interest”. This condition can only
be satisfied when the situations falling within that provision’s scope are somehow connected
to the State that has enacted the provision at hand.104 Furthermore, the need for a genuine
connection also follows from public international law, which limits the scope of a State’s
“jurisdiction to prescribe” to situations having a genuine connection with the enacting
State.105 However, this condition does not need to be specifically examined besides the other
conditions under Art. 9 (1). As mentioned, the existence of a genuine connection is neces-
sarily implied in the test imposed by that provision.
5. The competence to examine the compliance with the conditions under Art. 9 (1)
97As mentioned, the definition of overriding mandatory provisions under Art. 9 (1) means
that this notion is part of European law and therefore implies the competence of the Euro-
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102 See Rechtbank s’Gravenhage, 17.9.1982, CEP v. Sensor, RabelsZ (1983), p. 141, note Basedow, p. 147.
103 Magnus, para. 82; in a number of well-known decisions, in: Münchener Kommentar, paras 122 et seq.
104 This is confirmed by the Ingmar decision, in which the ECJ held that the mandatory provisions of the
Commercial Agency Directive were applicable when “the commercial agent carries on his activity within
the Community”: Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., (C-381–98) (2000), ECR 2000-I,
p. 9305, para. 25. See also Cass., Ch. com., 27.4.2011, RCDIP (2011), p. 624, noteM-EAncel, which refused
the application of the French rules on the direct action of the sub-contractor in the absence of a sufficient
connection to France.
105 In the Sensor case, the Dutch judge refused the application of US embargo provisions, holding that they
didn’t meet the genuine connection requirement set by public international law:Rechtbank s’Gravenhage,
17.9.1982, CEP v. Sensor, RabelsZ (1983), p. 141, note Basedow, p. 147. See also Renner, in: Calliess, Art. 9
Rome I, para. 27.
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pean Court of Justice to interpret it.106 The national court having the task to apply Art. 9 can
seize the Court for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU.
98 This is an important change of approach given that, under the Rome Convention, the
decision on whether to apply a national norm as an overriding mandatory provision fell
within the discretion of the Contracting States.107 While it is not for the Court to define
which national rules are “overriding mandatory,”108 it is nonetheless entitled, as with public
policy,109 “to review the limits within which the courts of a Contracting State may have
recourse to that concept.”
99 It is not easy to predict what the practical impact of this Court’s competence will be. It is
submitted that nothing will change in the cases where the application of a national provision
is in any event contrary to EU law, as was the case in Arblade and Mazzoleni.110 In these
instances, the Court of Justice will likely prefer to refer to the European freedoms rather than
venturing into the arduous question of clarifying the concrete scope of the definition of
overriding mandatory provisions of Art. 9 (1) of the Regulation.
100 However, there might be cases where the application of a national mandatory rule, albeit in
conformity with the principles of European law, does not comply with Art. 9 (1) of the
Regulation. In these instances, the Court will certainly insist, as it already did under the
Rome Convention in the Unamar case, that the national court seized must proceed to “a
detailed assessment” of the conditions set up by Art. 9 (1).111 It is to be seen whether the
Court will agree to fully assume its task, by formulating more specific criteria for the inter-
pretation of the language of Art. 9 (1) (e.g. the meaning of the terms “public interests”) and/
or guidelines on the inclusion of specific kinds of provisions into the scope of that article.
IV. Overriding Mandatory Provisions of the lex fori
101 After having defined overridingmandatory provisions, the Regulation describes in Art. 9 (2)
and 9 (3) the legal effect of these norms. For this purpose, it is convenient to distinguish the
overriding mandatory provisions belonging to the lex fori, those belonging to a foreign lex
causae and those belonging to the law of a “third” country.
102 As with Art. 7 (2) Rome Convention, Art. 9 (2) states that “[n]othing in this Regulation shall
restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum”. As
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106 Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 458; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 11, p. 136; Roth, in:
Festschrift für Gunther Kühne (2009), p. 869.
107 Nuyts RDC (2009), p. 557.
108 Thus, the concern expressed by Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–012, that a country might be required, “to
treat its own rules as overriding even where a domestic characterization would not attribute this effect,” is
unfounded.
109 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, (case C-7/98) (2000), ECR 2000-I, p. 1935, para. 23; Marco
Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company (case C-394/07) (2009),
ECR 2009-I, p. 2563, para. 34.
110 See supra, Art. 9 para. 91 et seq.
111 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, (Case C-184/12)
(2013), para. 52.
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already mentioned, this is the normal effect of an overriding mandatory provision: such a
norm is applicable, “irrespective of the law otherwise applicable” under Arts. 3 to 8 of the
Regulation. As it results from the term “lois d’application immediate” used by legal scholars
and adopted in some linguistic versions of the Regulation (in Portuguese: “normas de
aplicação imediata”), these rules are of “immediate” application, i.e. their application does
not depend on the ordinary choice-of-law rules.
103The terms “application” makes clear that the overriding mandatory provision determines
both its applicability conditions and its legal effect. Contrary to foreign mandatory provi-
sions under Art. 9 (3), the provisions belonging to the lex fori are not only “given effect”.
104Nothing changes when the lex fori is in any event applicable to the contract by virtue of the
ordinary choice-of-law rules of the Regulation. By contrast, when the contract is governed
by a foreign law, the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori take priority over the
irreconcilable provisions of the foreign law otherwise applicable. Nevertheless, the provi-
sions of the foreign lex contractus continue to be applicable, provided that they can be
reconciled with the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. Thus, the foreign lex
contractus is not necessarily and entirely replaced, but continues to govern the contract, with
the only exception being those aspects which are directly controlled by the overriding
mandatory provisions.
105As already mentioned, the application of a national overriding mandatory provision is
subject to some conditions. First, the provision must comply with the conditions set by
Art. 9 (1). Second, overriding mandatory provisions in force in a Member State cannot
infringe on European law. Finally, public international lawmust also be respected when it is
applicable in the State of the forum.
106When these conditions are satisfied, the Regulation, “does not restrict the application,” of
the overriding mandatory provision, as stated in Art. 9 (2). This language means that such
provisions can be applied, but do not have to be. In other words, the question of whether to
apply a national law provision within the meaning of Art. 9 is a decision of the court seized.
Of course, the court will normally have to respect the lawmaker’s intention. However, as
mentioned above, it also has to apply a proportionality test to ascertain whether the appli-
cation of the provision at hand is the most effective way to promote the underlying policy.112
107Although paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 9, by referring, respectively, to provisions of “a country”
and to provisions “of the law of the forum”, seem only to cover provisions of national law, it
is not disputed that mandatory provisions of European law can also have an overriding
reach and thus benefit from the immediate applicability under Art. 9 (2). Admittedly, Arts. 3
(4) and 23 of the Regulation also ensure, when they are applicable, the precedence of
mandatory rules of European law; nevertheless, recourse to Art. 9 is necessary when the
conditions of application of Arts. 3(4) and 23 are not satisfied. This is notably the case when
not all elements of the situation are located in one or more Member States and when no
special conflict-of-law rule is laid down by European law. Overriding mandatory provisions
originating from public international law can also benefit from Art. 9 (2), when they are in
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force in the forum country. A typical example is provisions on commercial embargo in-
cluded in resolutions of the UN Security Council.
V. Overriding Mandatory Provisions of a Foreign lex contractus
1. Applicability of the provisions of the lex contractus
108 Art. 9 (2) of the Regulation only covers the overridingmandatory provisions of the law of the
forum, and Art. 9 (3) refers to overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country
where the contractual obligations have to be or have been performed. Neither Art. 9, nor
other sections of the Regulation refer to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of
the contract, i.e. the law designated by the ordinary choice-of-law rules of the Regulation.
109 At first glance, the reasons for this omission are obvious. Art. 9 only refers to the rules which
are applicable, “irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract”. It is implied
that, subject to the public policy exception (Art. 21), the mandatory rules of the law govern-
ing the contract are in any event applicable by virtue of the ordinary choice of law rules,
without the need to resort to Art. 9. This is obviously the case for “domestically mandatory”
rules: by selecting a law as applicable to the contract, the choice-of-law rules refer to that law
in its entirety, including both default rules and mandatory rules. A fortiori, this must be true
for overriding mandatory rules, since these are, by definition, particularly important to the
interests of the country, the law of which is applicable to the contract.113
110 This reading of Art. 9 corresponds to an approach known, among German scholars, as the
“Schuldstatutstheorie”.114 According to some experts, this was the prevailing view during the
negotiations of the Regulation.115
111 However, this understanding is not unanimous. According to a different view, which is, in
particular, widely held among German scholars,116 the reference to the foreign lex contractus
by the ordinary choice-of-law rules does not include the overriding mandatory provisions
(“Eingriffsnormen”) of that legal system. Since these rules have their own applicability
criteria, which do not necessarily coincide with the connecting factors adopted by the
ordinary choice-of-law rules, their application depends on “special” conflict rules other
than those governing the contract (“Sonderanknüpfung”).117 Under the Regulation, this
reasoning implies that overriding mandatory rules of the lex contractus would only be
applicable under the very restrictive conditions of Art. 9 (3).118 This counter view should
be rejected because, for several reasons, it does not fit into the system of the Regulation.119
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113 Magnus, para. 134 et seq. See also the opinion of the A-G Szpunar in the case Republik Griechenland v.
Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15), para. 76.
114 Or, more exactly, “Kumulationslösung” because it accepts the application of the overriding mandatory
provisions of both the lex contractus and the law a third State under Art. 9 (3). SeeMartiny, in: Münch-
ener Kommentar, para. 43; Roth, in: Festschrift für Gunther Kühne (2009), p. 870.
115 Lando/Nielsen C.M.L. Rev. (2008), p. 1687.
116 See for instance Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 43; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9
Rom I-VO, para. 78.
117 On the theory of Sonderanknüpfung, see infra, Art. 9 para. 120.
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112The main reason, which we have already referred to, is based on the clear wording of Art. 9
(1). Overriding mandatory provisions are defined as provisions which are applicable irre-
spective of the otherwise applicable law, i.e. as a derogation from the law governing the
contract. A contrario, when the special conditions of Art. 9 are not satisfied, the only
applicable rules are those of the law of the contract, irrespective of whether they are man-
datory or not.
113Admittedly, this reading followed more clearly from the language of Art. 7 (1) Rome Con-
vention. By stating that “[w] hen applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect
may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation
has a close connection” (we emphasize), this provision clearly referred to the lois de police
belonging to the law of a “third” country, i.e. a legal system other than the lex fori and the lex
contractus. It was obvious, therefore, that overriding mandatory provisions belonging to the
lex contractus were not covered by Art. 7 and should be applied as a part of the law of the
contract. The wording of Art. 9 (3) is not so clear in this respect, since it does not distinguish
between the lex contractus and the law of a third country. However, there is no indication
that the drafters of the Regulation intended to depart from the approach of the Convention
on this point.120
114It should also be noted that the counter view is based on several assumptions which are not
necessarily shared by all of the Member States, and which in any event are not valid under
the Regulation:
– On one hand, the exclusion of the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex contractus
is based on an understanding of such norms as “Eingriffsnormen” within the German
meaning, as opposed to rules protecting the interests of individuals.121 However, as
mentioned above, the definition of overriding mandatory provisions under Art. 9 (1)
is broader, since it also encompasses rules protecting individuals. Now, although some
commentators take the opposite view,122 there is no reason why a mandatory rule of the
lex contractus aimed at protecting individuals should be discarded, simply because it has
an overriding reach.
– On the other hand, the counter view that the reference to the foreign lex contractus by the
ordinary choice-of-law rules does not include the overriding mandatory provisions of
that legal system is largely influenced by some older German decisions excluding the
application of foreign rules of public law.123 The question of the applicability of foreign
public law rules is not directly dealt with in the Regulation andwewill not examine it here
in detail. However, we would like to stress three points. First, the distinction between
private and public law is blurred and increasingly disputed, and it does not even exist as
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118 Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 43; Remien, in: Festschrift für Bernd von Hoffmann (2011),
p. 341; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 78.
119 This is accepted even by some of the proponents of the counter view: see Roth, in: Festschrift für Gunther
Kühne (2009), p. 873.
120 On the contrary, experts involved in the negotiations report that the application of the provisions of the
lex contractus was regarded as a matter of course: Lando/Nielsen C.M.L. Rev. (2008), p. 1687.
121 See supra, Art. 9 para. 75.
122 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 78.
123 See in particular Bundesgerichtshof, 17.12.1959, NJW (1960), p. 1101; RCDIP (1961), with a note by
Metzger.
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such in the legal systems of certain Member States (such as common law countries).
Second, the German position on the non-applicability of foreign public law rules is not
unanimously shared among the Member States. Third, non-applicability of foreign pub-
lic law (even if it were accepted in principle) does notmean that private law effects cannot
be extrapolated from foreign public law rules. This is expressly accepted by the Regula-
tion: as a matter of fact, under Art. 9 (3) effect may be given to certain foreign overriding
provisions even if they belong to public law. If this is possible under Art. 9 (3), there is no
compelling reason to exclude it with respect to the mandatory rules of the lex contractus.
115 Moreover, it is certainly true that overriding mandatory provisions have their own applic-
ability criteria, which are often different from the connecting factors used by the ordinary
choice-of-rules. However, applicability of these rules under the foreign lex contractus does
not mean that such criteria will be disregarded. The rules of a foreign lex causae apply in any
event only to the situations falling within their scope: therefore, the court seized must
examine whether the relevant rule is applicable or not in the case at hand. In other words,
the “self-limitation” of the foreign rule will not be ignored. If the norm does not cover the
situation at hand, it will be discarded and other rules of the lex contractus will apply instead.
So, the anti-trust legislation of the lex contractus will normally not apply unless the parties’
conduct had an impact on that country’s market. Similarly, the national rules protecting
exclusive distributors will probably not apply when the distribution takes place on foreign
markets.124 This has nothing to do with renvoi, excluded under Art. 20 of the Regulation.125
Moreover, the same is also true under Art. 9 (3): the overriding mandatory provisions of the
law of the place of performance, referred to under that provision, are not based necessarily
on that connecting factor and will only be given effect if the situation at hand falls within
their scope.
116 The criticised opinion would also lead to some unacceptable consequences. First, if over-
riding mandatory provisions of the lex contractuswere not applicable, they would have to be
distinguished in each case from the other provisions of that law, including its “domestically”
mandatory provisions. This would not only represent a very heavy burden for the court
seized, but also prove extremely detrimental to legal certainty, thus running counter to the
arguments that led to the newwording of Art. 9 (3). At the same time, the seized court would
have the power of discarding certain provisions of the lex contractus without these being
contrary to the public policy of the forum, thus circumventing the choice-of-law rules of the
Regulation. Last but not least, the effect of the counter view is that foreign overriding
mandatory provisions could only be given effect under the very narrow conditions of Art. 9
(3). Given that, one can wonder whether the restrictive wording of Art. 9 (3) would have
been accepted during the negotiations.
2. The impact of the will of the parties
117 It follows from our understanding of Art. 9, that the overriding mandatory provisions of the
lex contractus are applicable even when that law has been chosen by the parties, as allowed by
Art. 3, as well as by other rules of the Regulation. This means that the parties’ will can have
an impact on the application of overriding mandatory provisions.
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125 Contra: Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 78.
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118This is not particularly shocking. First, because the provisions of the lex contractus will only
be applicable if the situation falls within their scope: normally, the parties’ intention is not
sufficient for that purpose. Second, because the parties, by entering a choice-of-forum or an
arbitration agreement, can probably escape from the overridingmandatory provisions of the
law of a country, the courts of which would otherwise have jurisdiction over their disputes.126
Under the new Art. 9 (3), they can even escape from the overriding mandatory provisions of
other foreign countries, by entering into an agreement on the place of performance. That
being so, there seems to be no compelling reason to exclude that the parties’will can also lead
to the application of such provisions.
119Can the parties also agree, through a “submission clause”, on the applicability of the over-
riding mandatory provisions of a given country, the law of which is not applicable to the
contract?127 To answer this question, it is important to recall that under Art. 3 (1) of the
Regulation, the parties can select to have the law applicable to only a part of their contract.
Therefore, they should also have the right to submit to provisions governing specific aspects
of the contract, the only limitation being consistency with the rules applicable under the law
governing the contract as a whole. Furthermore, the parties can always incorporate by
reference into their contract the provisions of a law other than the lex contractus.128 Although
Recital 13 refers only to the incorporation of a non-State body of law or an international
convention, this possibility should be recognised a fortiori with respect to the rules of a
State’s legal system.
VI. Overriding Mandatory Provisions of the Law of a “Third” State
1. General remarks
a) Content
120Art. 9 (3) of the Regulation sets up the conditions for giving effect to foreign overriding
mandatory provisions as opposed to those belonging to the lex fori, covered by Art. 9 (2).
The direct antecedent of Art. 9 (3) was Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. This rule was inspired
by the German doctrine of the “Sonderanknüpfung” (“separate connection”), pursuant to
which overriding mandatory rules (“Eingriffsnormen”) are not subject to the ordinary
choice-of-law rules but should be applied according to special criteria.129
121In case law, the only direct forerunner of Art. 7 (1) of the Convention was the well-known
decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Alnati case.130 In this and other subsequent
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126 See infra, Art. 9 para. 195 et seq.
127 Remien, RabelsZ (1990), 473 et seq.
128 Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 46.
129 Wengler, Die Anküpfung des zwingenden Schuldrechts im internationalen Privatrecht. Eine rechtsver-
gleichende Studie, ZvglRW (1941), p. 168 et seq.; Wengler, Sonderanknüpfung, positive und negative
ordre public, JZ (1979), p. 175 et seq.; Zweigert, Nichterfüllung auf Grund auslänidscher Leistungsver-
bote, RabelsZ (1942), p. 283 et seq. The theoy had its roots in the reference, made by von Savigny’s, to
“Gesetze von streng posituiver, zwingender Natur”: von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts,
vol. VIII (1849), p. 182. See also Roth, in: Festschrift Gunther Kühne (2009), p. 860 et seq.
130 Hoge Raad, 13.5.1966, RCDIP (1967), p. 522, note Struycken.
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decisions,131 Dutch courts accepted, at least in principle,132 that foreign overriding manda-
tory provisions could be given effect although they were not part of the law governing the
contract, provided that a close connection existed between the situation and the enacting
State. In other countries, although the direct applicability of foreign overriding provision
was not recognised as a principle, the courts developed alternative approaches, based on
substantive rules of the lex contractus or on public policy, which allowed them to sometimes
give effect to such provisions.133
122 As mentioned above, Art. 9 (3) does not cover all foreign overriding mandatory provisions.
In particular, it does not deal with the provisions of the lex contractus, but only with those
belonging to the legal order of a “third” State, i.e. a law other than the lex fori or the lex
causae.134 Among these, effect may be given only to the provision of the law of the country
where the contractual obligation has to be or has been performed. By contrast, the over-
riding provisions of the lex contractus are applicable as part of that legal system, provided
that the situation falls within their scope. In this respect, the Regulation, as with the Rome
Convention before it, deviates from the theoretical postulates of the “Sonderanknüpfung”
doctrine.135
b) Purpose of Art. 9 (3)
123 Several arguments can be invoked for giving effect to foreign overriding mandatory provi-
sions not belonging to the lex contractus:136
– In some instances, the courts of a country may be willing to assist a foreign country in
promoting its policies or, at least, in preventing the violation of its laws. The reason for
this can be the wish to cooperate in the pursuit of specific common or shared interests, or
more generally the idea of “international comity”, based among other on the assumption
that foreign jurisdictions will reciprocate the courtesy shown to them.137
– By taking into account foreign mandatory rules, the courts can also shelter a party from
“conflicting duties” arising out of the contract and/or contradictory laws of different
countries. This concern is particularly important when a foreign State is in fact in a
position to enforce its laws, and/or to impose effective sanctions for non-compliance
(“Machttheorie”).138
– The quest for international harmony of decisions can also justify the application of
foreign mandatory rules; in fact, it is desirable that judgments rendered in the forum
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131 Hoge Raad, 12.1.1979, Sewrajsingh RCDIP (1980), note van Rooij; Rechtbank s’Gravenhage, 17.9.1982,
CEP v. Sensor, RabelsZ (1983), p. 141, note Basedow, p. 147.
132 In the cases cited above, foreignmandatory provisions were actually never given effect, due to the absence
of the required conditions.
133 See infra, Art. 9 para. 186 et seq.
134 Of course, in many cases lex fori and lex contractus are the same, so that the usual reference to a “third”
country is not accurate: Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 34 (“unechter Drittstaatsfall”).
135 See supra, Art. 9 para. 120.
136 See also the opinion of the A-G Szpunar in the case Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis
(C-135/15), para. 80.
137 Thus, in the Ralli case, which directly influenced the wording of Art. 9 (3), English courts considered that
they should not assist the parties in violating the laws of a foreign friendly country (see infra, Art. 9
para. 129). On the role of comity in this context, see Chong JPIL (2006), p. 37 et seq.
138 On the “Machttheorie”, see Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 39.
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be in harmonywith those that could be rendered by other potentially competent courts in
a foreign State.139 In turn, international uniformity prevents forum shopping and ensures
that judgments can circulate freely, without clashing with the fundamental interests of
other States concerned.
Art. 9 (3) does not give guidance as to which of these (and possibly other) objectives should
be pursued. In this respect, it is submitted that courts continue to enjoy a very wide discre-
tion.140
124By contrast, legal certainty pleads against giving effect to foreign overriding mandatory
provisions that are not part of the lex contractus. In fact, predictability is enhanced if the
contract is governed by one single law designated by the choice-of-law rules, in particular
when that law has been selected by the parties. Art. 9 (3) tries to strike a balance among these
(and others) conflicting interests.
c) The new conditions set by Art. 9 (3)
125The direct antecedent of Art. 9 (3) was Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. This provision allowed a
court to give effect to foreign overriding mandatory norms on the sole condition that the
situation presented a close connection with the State having enacted them. This decision was
left to the court’s discretion. It had to be based on diverse considerations related to the nature
of these rules and their purpose, as well as any consequences that would derive from their
application or non-application.
126This innovative, open-ended provision141 had generated strong reactions. While some com-
mentators celebrated it as an important step forward, opening new perspectives for the
future development of private international law, its detractors criticised the legal uncertainty
that this provision would entail and feared that it could vest courts with a quasi-political role,
well beyond the normal judge’s powers.142
127Because of the serious objections voiced by some Contracting States, Art. 22 Rome Con-
vention allowed a reservation against Art. 7 (1) – an option chosen by seven Contracting
States.143 Since reservations cannot be made with respect to a European regulation, a com-
promise had to be reached between the States that favoured Art. 7 (1) and those that were
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139 Bonomi YPIL (1999), p. 239 et seq.; Chong, JPIL (2006), p. 38 et seq.; Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 449. See also
the Commission’s Green Paper COM (2002) 654.
140 See also infra, Art. 9 paras 139–140 and 170 et seq.
141 The only direct forerunner of Art. 7 (1) of the Convention was the line of Dutch case law initiated by the
Hoge Raad decision in the well-known Alnati case: Hoge Raad, 13.5.1966, RCDIP (1967), p. 522, note
Struycken. See also Hoge Raad, 12.1.1979, Sewrajsingh RCDIP (1980), note van Rooij, and Rechtbank
s’Gravenhage, 17.9.1982, CEP v. Sensor RabelsZ (1983), p. 141, note Basedow, p. 147. Although the Dutch
courts accepted, in principle, the applicability of foreign overriding mandatory provisions, they always
refused to give effect to such provisions in the cases they had to decide. Although the direct applicability
of foreign overriding provisions was not recognised elsewhere, the courts of other countries developed
alternative approaches to sometimes give effect to such provisions: see infra, Art. 9 para. 185 et seq.
142 For references to the doctrine, see Bonomi, Le norme imperative (note 3), p. 294, note 229, as well as
p. 368 et seq. The excessive character of these criticisms is rightly underlined by Boschiero, p. 110.
143 Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and United Kingdom.
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opposed to it. While the Commission, followed by some Member States, had proposed to
maintain the disputed provision,144 someMember States insisted on deleting it, following the
precedent Rome II Regulation.145 Particularly strong was the opposition of the United King-
dom, which insisted on the suppression or substantial modification of Art. 7 (1) as a con-
dition for opting into the Regulation.146
128 In this context, Art. 9 (3) is the fruit of a political compromise. The new provision preserves
the possibility of giving effect to the overriding mandatory provisions of a foreign state while
imposing twomore specific and restrictive conditions. The first such condition concerns the
object of the mandatory rules in question. While the Convention posed no limitation in this
regard and restricted itself to requiring that the norm be considered as an overriding man-
datory provision in the legal order to which it belonged, Art. 9 (3) only permits a court to
give effect to mandatory provisions which would, “render the performance of the contract
unlawful”. The second condition is intended to specify, in a restrictive sense, the connection
required between the situation and the State that enacted a mandatory norm: whereas the
Convention simply required the existence of a “close connection”, without any further
specification, the Regulation refers only to the norms of the country, “where the obligations
arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed.”
129 The new provision goes back to the compromise proposals made in the Civil Law Commit-
tee by the Dutch and Swedish delegations.147 It is easy to recognise in its wording a sort of
restatement of a rule originally formulated by the English doctrine148 and adopted in the
well-known decision of the English Court of Appeal in the Ralli case.149 By virtue of this
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144 See Art. 8 (3) of the Commission’s Proposal.
145 Asmentioned above, Art. 16 Rome I Regulation only refers to the overridingmandatory provisions of the
lex fori.
146 This position was strongly influenced by the reactions of some stakeholders, in particular the City of
London, who feared that the uncertainty engendered by Art. 8 (3) of the Commission’s Proposal could
undermine business confidence in the United Kingdom. For an in-depth discussion of the United King-
dom position, see Chong JPIL (2006), p. 27 et seq.; Dickinson JPIL (2007), p. 53 et seq.; Harris, pp. 272 et
seq.
147 For details, see Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 453.
148 Dicey, The Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., London, 1908, p. 553.
149 [1920] 1 K.B. 287, Ralli Bros v. Compañia Naviera Sota y Aznar (26 March 1920). The English company
Ralli Brothers had chartered a ship belonging to the Spanish company Sota y Aznar in order to carry a
cargo of jute from Calcutta to Barcelona. Under the terms of the parties’ agreement, the one half of the
charter had to be paid in London upon the sailing of the ship from its port of embarkation, the remainder
being due upon arrival in Barcelona. After the arrival of the goods at destination, the sender refused to pay
the second portion of the price and invoked a Spanish decree setting, as a matter of mandatory law, the
total price of the charter in an amount inferior to the agreed upon amount. The English judges accepted
this defence despite the fact that the contract was governed by English law, on the grounds that they could
not assist in the violation of the laws of “friendly foreign” countries. For other cases in which this rule was
applied, see Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 13e ed. (ed. L. Collins), London, 2000, No 32–141 et
seq., p. 1246 et seq. In a distinct (although similar) line of precedents, English courts have also refused to
enforce contracts which the parties had entered into with the intention of violating foreign mandatory
provisions: Court of Appeal, 13.12.1924, Foster v. Driscoll, Law Journal, King’s Bench (1929), p. 282;
House of Lords, 21.10.1957, Regazzoni v. Sethia, 2 All ER (1957); ICLQ (1958), p. 164, noteMann; High
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precedent, a contract, albeit valid under the law that governs it, is without effect if its
performance requires the accomplishment of an act, which is considered unlawful by the
law at the foreign place of performance (lex loci solutionis). The similarity of Art. 9 (3) with
English case law obviously facilitated the decision of the United Kingdom to ultimately opt
into the Regulation.150
130By contrast, the second sentence of Art. 9 (3) is unchanged. As under Art. 7 (1) Rome
Convention, the court has discretion as to whether to give effect to the foreign overriding
mandatory provision. In taking this decision, it has to consider the nature of the provision,
its purpose as well as the consequences of its application or non-application.
d) Overall appraisal
131Art. 9 (3) has the merit of not completely excluding the possibility of giving effect to the
overriding mandatory provisions of a third State.151 In this respect, this provision is better
thanArt. 16 Rome I Regulation. Althoughwe are not aware of any court decisionmaking use
of the power conferred by Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention, it is important that the principle of
the potential pertinence of foreign overriding mandatory provisions be preserved, because
of the impact that this principle can have particularly in promoting international harmony
of decisions and international cooperation. It should also be noted that Art. 7 (1) has exerted
a certain influence on some national private international law codifications152 and that it is
sometimes cited by arbitrators confronted with the question of whether to apply overriding
mandatory provisions that do not belong to the lex causae. For these reasons, it is positive
that Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention was not simply deleted, even if its preservation was possible
only at the price of important concessions.
132Furthermore, the new provision is also applicable in thoseMember States, which hadmade a
reservation against Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. Thus, the courts of those States now also
have the possibility to give effect to foreign overriding mandatory provisions. This was
already the case in some of those Member States based on different approaches, such as
the “indirect application” of foreign rules as a matter of fact. However, this was not possible
in all those Member States.
133It should also be recognised that, in many cases, the solution provided for by Art. 9 (3) does
permit adequate results. We mention, as an example, a contract which creates obligations
that violate the antitrust laws of the place where it is to be performed. In such a case, a foreign
court can give effect to the norms that render the performance of the contract unlawful.153
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Court of Justice, Chancery Div., 27.2.1959, In re Emery’s Investment Trust, 1 Ch. (1959), p. 410. On these
cases, see Chong JPIL (2006), p. 33 et seq.
150 However, a number of differences exist between Art. 9 (3) and the Ralli case law: seeHarris, p. 306 et seq.
151 In is worth recalling that, at one stage of the negotiation, Art. 8 (3) of the Commission’s Proposal was
delated from the European’s Parliament draft report: see Harris, p. 291.
152 Analogous provisions can be found, for example, in Art. 19 of the Swiss Law on Private International Law
of 18 December 1987 and in Art. 3079 of the Civil Code of Québec of 1991.
153 See also Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 467.
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134 Nonetheless, the conditions provided for in the new text clearly constitute a step backwards
with respect to the Rome Convention.154 First of all, the new conditions are not likely to
substantially reduce the uncertainty connected with the effects of foreign overriding man-
datory provisions. Certainly, the question will arise in the future only with respect to the
rules of lex loci solutionis that render illicit the performance of a contractual obligation. To
some extent, these restrictions limit legal uncertainty.155 Nonetheless, several factors remain
difficult for the parties to predict: this is the case for a prohibitive legal norm to qualify as an
overriding mandatory provision in the legal order to which it belongs and, above all, for the
result of the discretionary evaluation that Art. 9 (3) continues to demand of the court.
Moreover, the reference to provisions which, “render the performance of the contract un-
lawful,” is not easy to interpret and the determination of the place of performance can give
rise to very serious difficulties, as is demonstrated by Art. 5 (1) Brussels I Regulation.
135 If uncertainty is inherent to the treatment of foreign overriding mandatory provisions, a
more serious objection is that the rationale of the two conditions included in Art. 9 (3) is
unclear, so that the limits that they imply are far from convincing.156
136 In particular, the reference to the law of the place of performance is overly restrictive. Giving
effect to the overridingmandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis can certainly be appropriate,
in particular when they render the performance of the contract unlawful. However, if one
considers the possible reasons for giving effect to foreign overriding provisions, the a priori
exclusion of provisions of this kind enacted in other foreign countries is not justified. Thus, if
giving effect to a foreign provision is aimed at protecting one of the parties from a “conflict of
duties”, the law of the country of domicile (or habitual residence, registered office, main
place of business) of that party would seem particularly relevant.157 If the purpose is to
promote international harmony and to prevent forum shopping, a court should be allowed
to look into the law of the countries, where proceedings were or could have been brought by
one of the parties in the case at hand. In order to facilitate the circulation of its own judg-
ment, a court should be able to give effect to the provisions of the country (or countries),
where that judgment would probably have to be enforced. Last but not least, if the seized
court is prepared to assist foreign countries in pursuing specific policies, or in preventing
evasion of the law, it should be allowed to give effect to the provisions of every country which
has, in the case at hand, a legitimate interest in imposing compliance with its own rules. This
is, in particular, the country, the law of which would have been applicable in the absence of
the parties’ choice. As illustrated by these examples, it would have been possible to define
more broadly the range of the relevant countries, while reducing the uncertainty related to
the open formulation of Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention.158
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154 Most commentators criticize the new rule. According to a view, however, the new rule “might not bring
about such great differences”: Hellner, JPIL (2009), p. 464.
155 Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016), para. 46.
156 See infra, Art. 9 para. 149 et seq., 154 et seq.
157 The compromise text proposed by The Netherlands originally also included a reference to provisions of
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was deleted, because this would be relevant only, “in cases of trade embargoes, economic sanctions and
the like,” and, “such cases were not considered sufficiently relevant to be included in the text.”
158 See also the critique of D’Avout, p. 2167 et seq.
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137Let us take, for example, the case of a contract concluded between parties domiciled in States
A and B in violation of a commercial embargo decreed by State A against State C. In the
absence of a choice of law, the applicable law would be that of State A, but the parties have
opted for the application of the law of State B. The contractual obligations must be per-
formed in States B and C. These two legal orders consider the contract to be valid but the
performance required of one of the parties is prohibited and punishable in State A where the
debtor is domiciled. Under such circumstances, it may appear to be justified for the courts in
State B to take into consideration the prohibitive norms of State A (domicile of the debtor).
This should be possible for a number of reasons which the courts should be able to appreci-
ate (i.e. in order to favour the uniformity of judgments as between States A and B, since the
judges of both of the States are potentially competent; to guarantee the enforceability in State
A of the judgment rendered in State B; to avoid a situation in which the debtor is confronted
with an inextricable “conflict of duties” resulting from the foreign judgment condemning
him to performance as opposed to the mandatory rules of his State of domicile; to assist the
foreign and “friendly” State A in avoiding the violation of its prohibitive norms). However,
such a possibility is excluded by Art. 9 (3) since the prohibitive norms in question are not
those of the locus solutionis.
138In order to reduce the impact of the new conditions, it is submitted that Art. 9 (3) should not
be constructed in an overly restrictive way. This is also justified, because this provision does
not require courts to give effect to the foreign overriding rules, but only allows them to do
so.159
139In light of the new conditions set by Art. 9 (3), it would be tempting to argue that the purpose
of this provision is also different from that of Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. Thus, a com-
mentator suggests that the “main rationale” of the new rule is, “to prevent parties from
having to commit unlawful acts in a foreign state.”160 In a similar sense, the observation was
made, by other scholars, that Art. 9 (3) is an expression of the so-called “Machttheorie.”161 In
other words, the rule would now (only) aim to protect one of the parties from what we have
called “conflicting duties.” If this were true, the other possible reasons for giving effect to
foreign mandatory provisions, which were relevant under the Rome Convention, would not
play a role anymore.
140Although convincing at first sight, we consider that such a reading of Art. 9 (3) is not
demanded by the wording of that rule, and would be overly restrictive. It should be noted,
first, that the limitation to the provisions of the law of the place of performance that renders
such performance unlawful, does not necessarily imply that the debtor’s interest is the only
relevant consideration. In fact, such limitations can also be justified by a different approach,
in particular if one assumes that the purpose of Art. 9 (3) is to assist a foreign State in
preventing the evasion of its laws. In fact, since prohibiting provisions are particularly
important from a country’s perspective, it may appear justified, in an attempt to reduce
uncertainty, to put the emphasis on those norms. And the reference to the place of per-
formance may be justified because this connecting factor gives legitimacy to a country’s
assertion of its own overriding interests. This is also confirmed by the English case law on
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161 In this sense, Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 63 et seq.
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which the recast is based (Ralli and others): in those decisions, English courts always stressed
that the prohibiting provisions were those of “a friendly foreign country”: such a factor,
which would be irrelevant if only the debtor’s interests were at stake, clearly illustrates that
comity was (also) determinant for those decisions. The wording of Art. 9 (3) indirectly
corroborates such a broader interpretation. On one hand, that rule does not require the
foreign provisions at the place of performance to be effective. Now, if the purpose is the
debtor’s protection, only foreign rules provided with effective sanctions should be taken into
consideration, as the “Machttheorie” postulates. By contrast, comity can also result in the
taking into account of foreign rules which the foreign country is not in a position to actually
enforce. On the other hand, if only the debtor’s interests were relevant, giving effect to the
foreign provision would essentially consist of exempting him from the consequences of non-
performance; in that case, it would have been sufficient for Art. 9 (3) to refer to the place
where the obligation in question is to be performed, and not to the place of a past perform-
ance. Finally, one should also consider that the effect of Art. 9 (3), if interpreted narrowly,
would probably often overlap with substantive law rules on impossibility or frustration of
contract, thus excessively reducing the practical usefulness of that provision.
2. The conditions for giving effect to a foreign mandatory provision
a) A foreign provision
141 As alreadymentioned, Art. 9 (3) only covers provisions enacted by a foreign country (or by a
foreign supranational organization). However, it does not apply to the provisions of the law
designated by the ordinary choice-of-law rules to govern the contract, because these provi-
sions are applicable by themselves as a part of the lex contractus. Because of the universal
scope of the Regulation (Art. 2), Art. 9 (3) also covers provisions belonging to the law of a
non-Member State.
b) An overriding mandatory provision
142 As with the preceding paragraphs of Art. 9, Art. 9 (3) also refers to “overriding mandatory
provisions”. The definition of these provisions provided by Art. 9 (1) is also relevant for the
purpose of Art. 9 (3).162
143 As discussed above, the qualification of a norm as being an overriding mandatory provision
is subject to three conditions: 1) the provision must be mandatory; 2) it must be regarded as
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests; 3) it must be applicable irrespective
of the law otherwise applicable to the contract.163 Since Art. 9 (3) deals with foreign provi-
sions, these conditions must be satisfied under the foreign law of the State having enacted
them.
144 The clearest cases, but probably also those least commonly occurring, are when the over-
riding reach of the foreign provision is expressly stated under foreign law. Failing an express
statement in this sense, the court seized will have to rely on the case law of the foreign
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country courts. Scholarly opinions can also be relevant to that effect, at least when they are
the clear expression of a majority view. In the absence of such elements, a foreign provision
should not be regarded as falling under Art. 9 (3).
145It is possible that the foreign country ignores the notion of an overriding mandatory provi-
sion. Even then, compliance with a domestic rule can be required in cross-border situations
for public policy reasons.164 To determine if this is indeed the case, the court seized has to be
satisfied that, under the law of the foreign country, the parties to the contract cannot
derogate from the foreign rule in question by including a contractual term and/or by the
choice of the law of a different country as applicable to the contract. Significant indications
as to the public policy relevance of a specific provision can also be deduced from the foreign
country’s case law on the enforceability of choice-of-forum and arbitration agreements and,
in particular, on the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions.
146If the provision at hand is regarded as an overriding mandatory provision (or a provision
belonging to public policy) in the foreign State that has enacted it, this will not be enough for
the purposes of Art. 9 (3). In fact, such a characterization does not necessarily fit the
definition of an overriding provision under Art. 9 (1). In theory at least, the court seized
in a Member State should still verify whether the evaluation made in the foreign country
corresponds to the standards set by the Regulation, in particular whether the foreign provi-
sion could really be regarded as “crucial” for the protection of a “public interest” within the
meaning of the Regulation. The compliance with such criteria should also be examined by
the European Court of Justice, if seized with a preliminary question. In practice, however, it
seems unlikely, and after all unnecessary, that the seized court examine these aspects.165 If the
foreign provision, because of its content or its purpose, does not reach the threshold required
by Art. 9, the court seized can simply reject its application by making use of its discretion
under Art. 9 (3).
147If a provision is not regarded as mandatory and overriding in the foreign State concerned,
the court seized will not be allowed to give effect to it under Art. 9 (3). This is true even if a
provision of the same kind would qualify as an overriding mandatory provision under the
law of the forum: if the foreign country does not regard its own provisions as crucial, it is not
for the forum court to look after that country’s interests.
148A delicate question arises when the foreign provision, albeit not explicitly qualified as an
overriding mandatory rule (or as a rule belonging to public policy) in the foreign country,
would nevertheless be applicable in the case at hand before that country’s courts on account
of the ordinary choice-of-law rules of the foreign law. This circumstance alone should not be
sufficient for the purpose of Art. 9 (3). However, the conclusion might be different if a closer
examination of the content and purpose of the relevant choice-of-law rules reveals that they
are based on public policy considerations.
c) A provision that renders the performance unlawful
149Under Art. 9 (3), only those foreign overriding provisions which “render the performance of
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the contract unlawful” can be given effect. Although the provision refers to norms having an
impact on the lawfulness of the contract as such, this also covers norms that prohibit the
performance of one or more specific obligations arising out of the contract.166 It is not
relevant whether the performance is unlawful from the beginning or becomes unlawful at
a later stage.167 The moment at which the provision was adopted or entered into force is also
irrelevant, provided that the situation falls within its scope.
150 In some instances, the foreign provisions prohibiting the performance of the contractual
obligations will also directly affect the validity or the enforceability of the contract as a whole.
Thus, the prohibition of exporting specific kinds of goods to a country under the terms of a
trade embargo frequently means that the contract is treated as null and void. But this is not
necessary for the purposes of Art. 9 (3). A foreign provision can be given effect even if it
prohibits (or otherwise renders unlawful) the performance of one or more specific obliga-
tions; the possible consequences of this partial unlawfulness on the contract as a whole will
then depend on the lex contractus.
151 At first glance, the wording of Art. 9 (3) seems to rule out provisions which positively impose
a specific behaviour on the parties to the contract, such as the obligation to pay damages in
the event of gross negligence or intentional breach of the contract, or the obligation to pay
compensation or an indemnity in the event of an anticipated termination of the contract.168
However, since non-compliance with such duties normally also renders the contract (and its
performance) unlawful, it is submitted that these rules also fall within the scope of Art. 9
(3).169 In such a case, the place of performance will then be either the place where the specific
duties in question should have been performed, or the place of performance of the main
obligations under the contract.
152 Such a reading of Art. 9 (3)170 can probably also cover provisions that grant one of the parties
the right to a specific remedy, such as the rules of French law giving the subcontractor a
direct action against the owner in the event of non-payment by the main contractor.171
However, it seems that Art. 9 (3) does not cover provisions that simply impose a duty of
information on one of the parties, without sanctioning non-compliance with such duty by
rendering the contract unlawful and/or unenforceable. It also does not cover the provision
conferring on one of the parties the right to terminate the contract.172
153 Art. 9 (3) does not require that the foreign overriding provision is effective, i.e. is capable of
being applied in the case at hand, nor that it renders the performance of the contract
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impossible or more difficult. Admittedly, since the only relevant provisions are those at the
place of performance, the foreign State will often be able to impose their application in
practice. However, this is not a condition, nor the only reason for giving effect to such
provisions. Thus, contrary to what has been suggested, Art. 9 (3) cannot be regarded as the
expression of the so-called “Machttheorie”.173
d) A provision of the law of the place of performance
154Pursuant to Art. 9 (3), only overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the place of
performance can be given effect, at the court’s discretion.174 As mentioned above, this
limitation is intended to reduce the uncertainty resulting from the reference made by Art. 7
(1) Rome Convention to the lois de police of all countries, with which the situation had a
close connection.
155Based on the wording of Art. 9 (3), the relevant law is that of, “the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed”. This language
closely resembles that in Art. 7 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation (former Arts. 5 (1) Brussels I
Regulation and Brussels Convention), which also refers, for jurisdictional purposes, to the
place where, under the contract, the contractual obligations have been or should have been
performed. Therefore, it would be tempting to borrow, for the interpretation of Art. 9 (3),
the criteria developed with respect to the Brussels I Regulation. As is well known, the
meaning of “place of performance” under those instruments was shaped by an important
legislative reform in 2000 and by a significant number of decisions by the European Court of
Justice. At first glance, a parallel interpretation of the two regulations seems desirable, both
for the purpose of taking advantage of the existing case law and for ensuring a certain degree
of uniformity between the two instruments. Moreover, giving effect to the overriding man-
datory provisions of the Member State, the courts of which have jurisdiction under the
Brussels I Regulation, would promote international harmony of decisions, while at the same
time discouraging forum shopping.175 However, a closer examinationmakes it clear that this
apparently appealing solution should be rejected.176
156First of all, Art. 7 (1) Brussels I Regulation, as a jurisdictional rule, only refers to a place of
performance in a Member State. If the place of performance is in a non-Member State, that
jurisdictional ground is not pertinent. By contrast, Art. 9 (3) also refers to foreign overriding
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176 Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 113 et seq.;Magnus, para. 101;Nuyts RDC (2009), p. 564; Remien, in: Festschrift
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provisions enacted in a non-Member State, provided that the place of performance is located
in that State. This is not expressly stated by that provision, but it clearly follows from the erga
omnes reach of the Regulation’s provisions as announced in Art. 2. Thus, there is in any
event no guarantee that the overriding provisions referred to by Art. 9 (3) are those of a
Member State having jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. This reduces the value of
a uniform construction of the notion of place of performance under the two Regulations.
157 Furthermore, Art. 7 (1) and its construction are largely influenced by the jurisdictional
objectives of the Brussels I Regulation, in particular by the purpose of ensuring access to
justice while preventing, at the same time, an excessive multiplication of the available fora.
These concerns are absent in the case of Art. 9 (3). As mentioned above, this provision is in
itself narrower than Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention and probably even too narrow. Therefore,
there is no ground for a restrictive reading of the notion “place of performance”, since this
would further limit the range of the potentially relevant foreign overriding provisions.177
158 This is the case with respect to the selection of the relevant obligation. It is well known that
Art. 7 (1) Brussels I Regulation refers, for certain contracts, to the place of performance of
the obligation in dispute, whereas, for other contracts (sale of goods and provision of
services), it targets the place of performance of the characteristic obligation (respectively,
the delivery of goods and the provision of services). While such distinction is already
questionable with respect to jurisdiction, it lacks any objective foundation in relation to
overriding provisions. Thus, there is no serious reason for excluding from the scope of Art. 9
(3) a provision that prohibits, in a given country, the payment of the price or the perform-
ance of another contractual obligation, even if it is not the characteristic obligation of the
contract.178 Although the national law of a Member State cannot give determinant guidance
for the interpretation of a European law rule, it is instructive that the Ralli Brothers decision,
from which the language of Art. 9 (3) is taken, in fact concerned the obligation to pay the
price in a charter party.179 Indeed, giving effect to such normsmay be considered appropriate
for several reasons, such as preventing conflicting duties, assisting the foreign State in
avoiding evasion of the law, or facilitating the recognition and execution of the judgment
in that State.
159 Similar reasoning also applies with respect to the determination of the place of performance,
another very delicate issue. Under the Brussels Convention, the European Court of Justice
used to refer to the law applicable to the contract.180 This approach is still valid under Art. 7
(1)(a) Brussels I Regulation, while concerning Art. 7 (1)(b) the Court has developed other
criteria, based on that rule’s jurisdictional objectives. Once again, since the jurisdictional
concerns underlying the Brussels I Regulation are not relevant for the purpose of the Rome I
Regulation, the case law concerning Art. 7 (1)(b) should not be automatically referred to for
the interpretation of Art. 9 (3).
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160How is then the place of performance to be determined for the purpose of Art. 9 (3)? In our
opinion, this question should not necessarily always be answered in the same way. In fact, it
seems that, depending on the reasons for giving effect to a foreign overriding provision, the
criteria to be used for determining the place of performance could be different.
161Thus, although the language of Art. 9 (3) clearly refers first to the place where the obligation
was actually performed, this criterion does not seem to be pertinent in the all too common
situation (which according to one opinion, also corresponds to the main rationale of Art. 9
(3)), where the foreign mandatory provision is relied upon by the debtor in order to be
exempted from liability. In such circumstances, the obligation has not yet been performed,
hence the relevant place is that where the obligation is to be performed.
162To determine this place, the paramount criteria should be the parties’ agreement.181 Failing
such agreement, it is necessary to look into the law applicable to the contract.182 The place
designated by the parties or by the default rules of the lex contractus is the one where the
debtor has to perform its obligation: therefore, prohibiting rules in force at that place are
certainly relevant from his perspective. Furthermore, the reference to the agreed place of
performance or to the place pointed to by the rules of the lex contractus has the merit of
respecting the parties’ expectations. It also allows the parties to “pre-determine”, by an
agreement on the place of performance or, at least, on the applicable law, the range of the
potentially applicable overriding provisions, thereby reducing the uncertainty created by
Art. 9 (3).183
163However, when the purpose for giving effect to the foreign provision is not (only) to protect
the debtor, but rather to assist a foreign country in preventing evasion of the law of the
foreign country (i.e. comity), the place of actual performance can also be relevant, as spelled
out by Art. 9 (3).184 In fact, even if the unlawful act of performance has already taken place,
the forum court might be willing to give effect to the foreign rules in order to assist the
foreign country in restoring legality (by declaring, for instance, that the contract is null and
void). The actual place of performance is then relevant, even if it does not correspond to the
parties’ agreement or to the default rules of the lex contractus. If the obligation has not yet
been performed, the parties’ agreement will normally be relevant, unless the place of per-
formance was chosen with the purpose of avoiding the foreign overriding provisions.
164It has been held that the place of performance should be determined by simply referring to
what is provided for by the foreign overriding mandatory provision itself.185 This suggestion
is not convincing. On one hand, the applicability of the foreign provision does not neces-
sarily depend on the location of the place of performance. On the other hand, even if it is the
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case, the reference to the notion of the foreign law would amount to applying the foreign law
provision whenever it claims application and thus deprive the condition set by Art. 9 (3) of
its meaning.186 Of course, a reference to the law of the forum would also be improper.187
165 A particular problem arises when a contractual obligation is to be performed in several
different countries. Here again, the reference to the solutions adopted under the Brussels I
Regulation would be displaced. While it is normally excessive to allocate jurisdiction to the
courts of all of these countries, there is no compelling reason to rule out the overriding
provisions that, in one or more of these countries, render the performance unlawful.188 Of
course, the effect of such provisions would probably be limited, at least initially, to the
obligations to be performed in the country concerned, while their impact on the contract
as a whole can only be assessed by the lex contractus.189
166 A similar approach should also be followed, at least in some cases, when the place of
performance is situated in one country, but single acts relevant for the performance must
be effected in another country: for instance, the place of manufacturing or that of shipping of
the goods can be relevant if these acts are prohibited by an overriding provision of the local
law, even if the place of delivery is situated in a different country.190 In certain instances, the
place of final destination of the goods could also be relevant, even when, strictly speaking, it
is not the place of delivery.191
167 Because of the disparities between Art. 9 (3) and Art. 7 (1) Brussels I Regulation identified
above, it is possible that the court seized under the latter jurisdictional rule gives effect to the
overriding mandatory provisions of a foreign country (a Member State or a non-Member
State) where the contractual obligations (or some of them) are to be or have been performed.
Similarly, a court having jurisdiction on a different ground (e.g. the courts at the defendant’s
domicile, under Art. 4 Brussels I Regulation) might give effect to the provisions of the law of
another Member State, even if the courts of that State would not have jurisdiction under
Art. 7 (1) Brussels I Regulation.
3. The court’s discretion
168 When the above-mentioned conditions are satisfied, the seized court may give effect to a
foreign overriding mandatory provision. As already provided for in Art. 7 (1) Rome Con-
vention, Art. 9 (3) only confers to the court a discretional power, but does not impose a duty
to do so.
648 August 2016
Article 9 Rome I Regulation
186 See also Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 116.
187 Harris, p. 315.
188 Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 114; Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 116.
189 Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 114; Harris, p. 316.
190 For a similar reading, see Pfeiffer EuZW (2008), p. 628; Harris, p. 316 et seq.; Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 466
(these scholars seem to consider that it should be possible to give effect to import and export restrictions,
even if the place of performance in a strictly legal term is not situated in the country having enacted those
rules).
191 This was the case in the well-known English cases Foster v. Driscoll and Regazzoni v. Sethia (see supra,
note 143), as pointed out byHarris, p. 319. See also the decision by theGermanBundesgerichtshof of 22.6.
1972, 59 BGHZ 82, in the case of the Nigerian masks,.
© Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt
169According to a frequently voiced opinion, the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in
Art. 4 (3) TEU might even include a duty of the EU Member States to assist each other in
pursuing shared policies.192 However, this probably goes too far. Such a cooperation duty
only exists when it is stated in a specific provision193 or when the rules enacted by another
Member State reflect a policy of the European Union.194 Nevertheless, it is true that, in the
relations among theMember States, the uniformity of decisions andmutual trust are of such
outstanding importance that the application of the overriding mandatory provisions en-
acted by another Member State should be regarded as the normal solution.195
a) Reasons for giving effect to a foreign overriding provision
170As mentioned before, a court may have several reasons for giving effect to a foreign over-
riding mandatory provision. Some of these reasons reflect party interests (e.g. avoiding a
“conflict of duties”, promoting international harmony of decisions or facilitating the rec-
ognition and enforcement of the decision), others State interests (e.g. assisting a foreign State
in pursuing its policy in a certain area, or in avoiding evasion of the law). Since Art. 9 (3) does
not give any indication in this regard, courts can freely exercise their discretion, provided
that the other conditions set by that provision are satisfied.
171Admittedly, this creates the risk of diverging decisions in the EU Member States. Thus, the
national courts of different Member States may be more or less inclined to giving effect to
foreign overriding provisions. In order to promote uniformity, some scholars call for clar-
ifications by the ECJ.196 However, this wish sounds unrealistic. Under its present wording,
Art. 9 (3) does not contain any indication on how and for what purposes a court’s discretion
should be exercised. Any attempt by the European Court of Justice to limit or to orient that
discretion would lack a sound legal basis.
b) Factors to be taken into account
172When taking its discretional decision, the court must consider the nature and purpose of the
foreign provision as well as the consequences of its application or non-application. This
language has been adopted from Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. These conditions are quite
vague and do not imply any significant restriction of a court’s discretion. Nevertheless, they
show that the court decision should be motivated by and based on a detailed assessment of
all the circumstances of the case.
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173 The reference to the nature of the foreign provision is very broad, and far from clear.
Obviously, the court will have to take into account the content of the provision at hand.
However, as discussed above, Art. 9 (3) only covers the norms that render the performance
of the contract unlawful. In this respect, the court has no discretion. The court can also
consider whether the foreign provision belongs to private or public law where such a dis-
tinction exists in the foreign legal system concerned, and look at the kind of sanctions
provided for non-compliance (criminal or administrative law sanctions certainly hold more
weight than simple private law sanctions).
174 Much clearer is the reference to the purpose of the rule, in other words to its underlying
policy. This aspect is also relevant, under Art. 9 (1), for a rule to qualify as an overriding
mandatory provision: as mentioned above, it will only be appropriate for the provision to
qualify as such if it is regarded as crucial by a State for safeguarding its public interests. It is
obvious that the goal of the rule is also extremely important for the decision on whether to
give effect to such a rule or not under Art. 9 (3).
175 The same is true for the consequences of the rule’s application or non-application. These
include the consequences for the parties to the contract, but also for third parties as well as
for the States concerned (the foreign State having enacted the rule, but also the forum State
and the State whose law is otherwise applicable to the contract).
176 The respective roles of these factors depend on the circumstances of the case and on the
reasons why the seized court is willing to give effect to a specific foreign provision. Thus, the
purpose of the provision is particularly important when the reason for giving effect to it is to
assist the foreign State in pursuing its policies. This objective becomes relevant only when
the policy that underlies the foreign provision is somehow shared by the forum. Such a
shared policy obviously exists when compliance with the foreign rule also directly furthers
forum interests (or the interests of the European Union or those of the international com-
munity): e.g. a norm prohibiting arms or drug trafficking, or the abusive export of cultural
goods. In this case, the argument for giving effect to the foreign provision is particularly
strong. However, a shared goal may also be said to exist when the foreign provision, al-
though not directly impacting on the forum interests, reflects policy choices that find their
equivalent in the legal system of the forum (including European law): accordingly, although
a State is not directly interested in ensuring compliance with foreign antitrust rules aimed at
protecting free competition on a foreign market, local courts might consider it appropriate
to assist the foreign State in imposing observance of those rules if they correspond to the
anti-trust rules of the lex fori.
177 The purpose of the foreign provisions is less important when the main reason for giving
effect to them is not cooperation with the foreign State, but the protection of a party’s
interests. Thus, in order to shelter a party from a conflict of duties, a court might be willing
to give effect to foreign provisions based on an underlying policy even where no equivalent
policy exists in the forum (subject to ordre public, of course). In other words, the conse-
quences of ignoring the foreign rules hold more weight than the policy underlying them.
178 The consequences of a foreign norm’s application or non-application also play a key role
when the court’s primary concern is to further international harmony of decisions. This
objective is particularly important within the boundaries of the European Union, where the
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choice-of-law rules are unified and the court decisions can freely circulate among the Mem-
ber States. In this framework, to prevent forum shopping, it may be appropriate to give effect
to the overriding mandatory provisions enacted by a foreign Member State, in which the
court would also have had jurisdiction to hear the case. The nature and purpose of the
foreign provisions only plays a secondary role in this respect.
c) Limits to the court’s discretion
179In any event, the effects of the foreign provision should not contradict the public policy of
the forum. Courts will normally give due consideration to this while making use of their
discretion under Art. 9 (3), so that it should not be necessary to resort to the public policy
clause of Art. 21. As is generally the case, public policy also includes the fundamental
principles of European law as well as crucial European policies. The overriding mandatory
provisions of the law of the forum and those of European law must also be complied with.
4. Giving effect to a foreign overriding provision
180When the conditions set by Art. 9 (3) are fulfilled, effect can be given to a foreign overriding
mandatory provision, provided that the court decides, in its own discretion, to do so. The
expression “to give effect” was already used in Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention. It was preferred
to “apply”, because it covers both the “direct application” of the provision at hand and its
“indirect application” under the law applicable to the contract.197 According to widely held
opinion, the court can choose between these two options.
181If the court decides to apply a foreign provision, two different laws will concurrently apply to
the contract. The foreign law to which the overriding mandatory provision belongs will only
control the specific issue regulated by that provision (“Sonderanküpfung”); for all other
aspects, the contract will be governed by the lex contractus. In particular, the law applicable
to the contract will determine the consequences of the unlawfulness of a contractual obli-
gation on the contract as a whole.198 This amounts to splitting the contract (“depéçage”),
similar to what happens with respect to overriding mandatory provision of the lex fori. If the
two laws are irreconcilable, the foreign mandatory provision will prevail as a lex specialis.
182By contrast, the court can also decide to give effect to the foreign provision as a simple fact,
while applying the law applicable to the contract.199 In this case, subject to other specific
provisions of the Regulation, the contract is entirely governed by one single law, determined
by virtue of the ordinary choice-of-law rules. When applying the rules of the lex contractus,
the court can however take into account the overriding mandatory provision enacted by the
third State in order to give effect to them (“indirect application”, “materiellrechtliche Be-
rücksichtigung” in German). In this case, the foreign rules, and their inobservance, are
regarded only as a matter of fact, the legal consequences of which are determined by the
lex contractus.
183The indirect application of the rules of a law other than the lex contractus is also provided
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197 The admissibility of an indirect application of foreign lois de police was undisputed under the Rome
Convention. See Report Giuliano/Lagarde, p. 26; Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 114 et seq.
198 Harris, p. 312; Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 463.
199 Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 115; Magnus, para. 121; Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 81.
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under Art. 10 (2) of the Regulation, pursuant to which, “regard shall be had,” to the law of the
place of performance, “in relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in
the event of defective performance.” A similar rule is also included in Art. 17 Rome II
Regulation, according to which “account shall be taken, as a matter of fact […] of the rules
of safety and conduct which were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the
liability,” to the purpose of “assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable.”
184 As is the case under the Rome II Regulation, foreign overridingmandatory provisions can be
given indirect effect in order to establish or exclude the parties’ liability under the contract,
or to determine the degree of liability (e.g. simple or gross negligence). Moreover, they can
be relevant for assessing the validity of the contract under the lex contractus. They can also
help to determine the parties’ intent, which can be relevant with respect to the formation and
the construction of the contract.
5. The impact of Art. 9 (3) on alternative ways for indirectly applying foreign
overriding provisions
185 As with Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention, Art. 9 (3) is the expression of a private international
law approach to the question of the relevance of foreign overriding mandatory provisions.
As such, it precludes the application of national private international law rules having the
same nature and scope.200 This is probably also true for those countries where foreign over-
riding mandatory provisions were given effect via the notion of public policy.201 Given the
existence of a specific rule in Art. 9 (3), it seems reasonable to consider that the public policy
clause of the Regulation (Art. 21) cannot be applied for the same purpose.
186 However, in some countries, the courts have adopted another approach to addressing the
issue of foreign mandatory provisions based on the application of the substantive law rules
of the lex contractus. According to this alternative methodology, the existence of a foreign
mandatory provision, or the non-compliance with such a provision, are taken into account
as simple facts, producing specific effects under the rules of the law applicable to the contract
(so-called “Datumtheorie”).202
– Thus, the existence under a foreign law of a rule prohibiting specific conduct, which the
debtor would have to engage in in order to perform a contractual obligation, is regarded,
under a number of national contract law doctrines such as impossibility, frustration or
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200 As stated by the ECJ in the decision Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016),
para. 49, “the list, in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, of the overriding mandatory provisions to which
the court of the forummay give effect is exhaustive.”Thus, it is obvious that the Belgian andDutch courts
are not allowed, in contractual disputes, to give effect to foreignmandatory provisions based, respectively,
on Art. 20 (3) of the Belgian PIL Code or on Art. 7 (3) of Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code.
201 Thus, French courts have occasionally held that international public policy was opposed to the enforce-
ment of a contract aimed at violating the law of a foreign State: Tribunal civil de la Seine, 4.1.1956, Spitzer
v. Amunategui, RCDIP (1956), p. 679, note Batiffol (voidness of a contract concluded in violation of the
Spanish foreign exchange regulation); Cour d’appel Paris, 9.2.1966, RCDIP (1966), p. 264 (voidness of a
sale of war weapons to be smuggled).
202 The Datumtheorie goes back to Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws, Buffalo Law
Rev. (1966), p. 55 et seq. See also Jayme, Ausländische Rechtsregeln und Tatbestand inländischer Sach-
normen, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Albert Ehrenzweig (1976), p. 35 et seq.
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hardship, as a reason for the exemption from liability in the event of breach or as a
legitimate ground for terminating or adapting the contract.203 A key condition for such
an outcome is, generally, that the foreign prohibition is effective, i.e. that the legal sanc-
tions it provides for also have a concrete chance of being enforced.204 Moreover, some
genuine connectionmust exist between the situation and the country that has enacted the
prohibition.205
– German courts have gone even further, finding that a contract concluded in breach of a
foreign overriding mandatory provision is to be regarded, at least in certain circumstan-
ces, as a contract offensive to morals (“sittenwidrig”), and, as such, null and void.206
187After the entry into force of the Rome I Regulation, the question arises as to whether the
Member States’ courts are still allowed to follow this approach and, thus, to give effect to a
foreign mandatory provision, despite the lack of one of the conditions now set by Art. 9 (3).
Some commentators had taken a negative stance, arguing that the purpose of Art. 9 (3) is to
cover, exhaustively, the effects of foreign overriding provisions.207 However, in the Nikifor-
idis case, the ECJ rejected this overly strict interpretation holding that Art. 9 (3) “does not
preclude overriding provisions of a State other than the State of the forum or the State where
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being
taken into account as a matter of fact, in so far as this is provided for by a substantive rule of
the law that is applicable to the contract.”208 This ruling should be approved for several
reasons:
188First, the scope Rome I Regulation is clearly limited to the determination of the law appli-
cable to the contract. It is a private international law instrument; as such, it does not purport
to impact on the substantive rules of contract law in force in the Member States.209 If the
substantive law rules of the law applicable under the Regulation lead to indirect effect being
given to a foreign law provision, they should be applied, as is the case with all other sub-
stantive law rules belonging to the governing law. In this respect, one should also not lose
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203 Thus, German courts have occasionally held that the enactment of a foreign prohibition after the con-
clusion of the contract could be regarded as an impediment for the performance of the contractual
obligations (§ 275 BGB), or as an event frustrating the purpose of the contract (“Wegfall der Geschäfts-
grundlage”, now § 313 BGB): see the decision by the Bundesgerichtshof of 30.11.1972, 60 BGHZ 14, 11.3.
1982, 83 BGHZ 197, and 8.2.1984, IPRax (1986), p. 154.
204 This approach is also an expression of the “Machttheorie” (see supra, Art. 9 para. 123).
205 This sounds similar to Art. 9 (3). However, in general, the required connection is deemed to be present
not only when the prohibiting norm is in force at the place of performance of the contractual obligation,
but also in other circumstances, e.g. when that norm belongs to the law at the debtor’s domicile.
206 See the decisions by the Bundesgerichtshof of 21.12.1960, Borax, 34 BGHZ 169, 24.5.1962, Borsäure, NJW
(1962), p. 1436, and 22.6.1972, “Nigerian masks”, NJW (1972), p. 1572.
207 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO para. 81. See also Harris, p. 302 and 333. According to
Freitag IPRax (2009), p. 115, only recourse to § 138 BGB is now excluded in Germany, whereas concepts
like impossibility and frustration can still be used. For a similar solution: Magnus, para. 124.
208 Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016), para. 51. This ruling confirms the
opinion of several commentators, such asMankowski IPRax (2016), 491;Martiny, in: Münchener Kom-
mentar, para. 117; Roth, in: Festschrift für Gunther Kühne (2009), p. 875; Renner, in: Calliess, Art. 9
Rome I, para. 32; Hellner JPIL (2009), p. 469 et seq.
209 Republik Griechenland v. Grigorios Nikiforidis (C-135/15) (2016), para. 52.
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sight of the fact that the law applicable to the contract under the Regulation can be that of a
non-Member State: it cannot be seriously argued that the contract law rules of a non-
Member State should be discarded, when (and because) they lead to the foreign mandatory
provision of a third country being given effect to. If this is true for the law of a non-Member
State, it should also apply, a fortiori, to the law of a Member State.
189 Second, it could not be argued that the purpose of Art. 9 (3) (or its “effet utile”) would be
undermined by the concurrent use of substantive law rules. Certainly, the purpose of that
provision is to limit the uncertainty connected with the broad wording of Art. 7 (1) Rome
Convention. However, the doctrine of indirect applicability was mainly used in those States
whichmade the reservation against that provision. Therefore, it would be surprising that the
“recast” of Art. 7 (1) would impact on the case law of those States that never applied that
provision.
190 Last but not least, the reference to substantive law rules should still be allowed for practical
reasons, i.e. in order to avoid the harsh consequences of the overly narrow conditions set by
Art. 9 (3). This argument is particularly strong when a foreign mandatory provision not
covered by Art. 9 (3) (for instance, because it does not belong to the law of the place of
performance) makes the performance (subjectively) impossible, or creates hardship for one
of the parties.
191 Since the use of the “Datumtheorie” is still possible after the entry into force of Art. 9 (3), a
very delicate question arises in those countries where foreign overriding provisions were
taken into account by way of specific rules or doctrines whose characterization as belonging
to substantive law or to private international law is disputed. Thus, in a number of well-
known decisions, English courts have held that certain foreign mandatory rules should be
given effect as a matter of public policy. However, given that, in most of those cases, the
disputed contract was governed by English law, “public policy”was not used (as in Art. 21 of
the Regulation) as a device for rejecting foreign law, but rather as a substantive rule of
English law requiring the application of a foreign provision. This is quite similar to the use
that German courts have made of the notion of “Sittenwidrigkeit” within the meaning of
§ 138 BGB.210 If this is true, it could be argued that this line of authorities survives the entry
into force of the Regulation and can be relied upon as an alternative avenue for giving effect
to foreign mandatory provisions.211
VII. The Impact of Overriding Mandatory Provisions on Conflicts of Jurisdiction
192 As is the case with all rules included in the Rome I Regulation, Art. 9 only deals with issues of
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210 However, the exact meaning of these authorities is very controversial: see Harris, p. 299 et seq. For a
different understanding, see Plender/Wilderspin, para. 12–024, who consider that English public policy
could also have been used if the law applicable to the contract had been a foreign law. See also Royal
Boskalis Westminster v. Mountain, [1997] EWCA Civ. 1140.
211 Contra:Harris, p. 302 and 333. This author considers that, “it would seemmore than a little unfortunate
for the United Kingdom adamantly to insist upon a very narrow provision such as Art. 9 (3) […] only
then to reintroduce its pre-Convention authorities from a bygone era.”We understand this position, but
it should not be forgotten that the question does not only concern English case law, but also the case law
of other Member States, who would have preferred a much broader provision than Art. 9 (3).
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applicable law. It does not provide any indication as to the effect of overriding mandatory
provisions on judicial jurisdiction nor on the recognition and enforcement of foreign deci-
sions. In Europe, these issues are regulated by the Brussels I Regulation and by the Lugano
Convention as well as, to a certain extent, by the national rules in force in the individual
Member States.
1. Overriding mandatory rules and jurisdiction
a) General remarks
193There is an obvious link between overriding mandatory provisions and judicial jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Art. 9 (2), the overriding provisions of the lex fori take precedence over the
ordinary choice-of-law rules of the Regulation. However, the application of the overriding
provisions enacted by a Member State is not guaranteed when proceedings are initiated
before a foreign country. When the court seized is that of another Member State, these
provisions could be given effect under the conditions of Art. 9 (3); however, because of the
discretionary nature of that paragraph, there is no guarantee that they will be. The situation
is even more uncertain when the court seized is that of a non-Member State, since then the
overriding provisions of a Member State will be given effect to only if this is mandated or
permitted by the conflict rules in force in the country of the proceedings.212 In such a
framework, one cannot exclude the possibility that the parties may try to escape undesired
overriding provisions of a given law by initiating proceedings in a foreign State or, evenmore
effectively, by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a court (or the courts) of such a State.
194It follows that in order to ensure the effective enforcement of its overriding mandatory
provisions, a State should confer jurisdiction on its courts. Failing an express legislative basis
for jurisdiction, the question arises as to whether jurisdiction can be impliedly inferred from
the enactment of an overriding mandatory provision. This is obviously not possible when
uniform jurisdictional rules are applicable, as is the case under the Brussels I Regulation and
the Lugano Convention. Insofar as the reach of a State courts’ jurisdiction is still governed by
national law,213 the answer depends on the features of each single country’s law.214 In many
systems, however, jurisdictional rules must be expressly stated, and cannot be simply in-
ferred from substantive law rules.
b) Overriding mandatory provisions and choice-of-court agreements
195A delicate and much debated question concerns the impact of overriding mandatory provi-
sions on the enforceability of a choice-of-court agreement. The question can arise before the
courts of the State that has enacted an overriding mandatory provision, when the parties
have conferred jurisdiction on the court (or the courts) of a foreign State. Should the court
seized decline jurisdiction (with the risk that the overriding provision will not be enforced)
or should they consider that the choice-of-court agreement is unenforceable? By contrast, if
the foreign selected court is seized, the parties’ agreement will normally be regarded as
valid.215
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212 Or, in the case of an “indirect” application, by the substantive rules of the lex contractus.
213 In particular, when the defendant is domiciled in a non-Member State (Art. 6 Brussels I Regulation).
214 See Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP (2009), p. 11.
215 Unless the selected court decides to give effect to the foreign overriding mandatory provision, including
its jurisdictional effects, and declines jurisdiction. However, this seems very unlikely in practice.
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196 In some instances, specific jurisdictional rules exclude the validity or enforceability of such
an agreement. This is the case in the area covered by exclusive or mandatory jurisdictional
rules. Thus, for disputes relating to tenancies of immovable property, Art. 24 Brussels I
Regulation confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the Member State where the
property is situated, thereby excluding choice-of-court agreements. Similarly, in the field
of insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the protective provisions of Arts. 15, 19
and 23 Brussels I Regulation rule out choice-of-court agreements entered into before the
dispute arises, unless they are more favourable to the weaker party. Indirectly, these provi-
sions ensure the application of overridingmandatory provisions thatmight be in force in the
country, the courts of which have jurisdiction.
197 According to prevailing opinion, the existence of overriding mandatory provisions cannot
have any impact on the validity of a choice-of-court agreement under Art. 25 Brussels I
Regulation.216 As is well known, this provision sets a number of substantive and formal
conditions for the validity of a choice-of-court agreement, but it does not refer to overriding
mandatory provisions. Since the latest recast, Art. 25 (1) refers, for the substantive validity of
the agreement, to the law of the State, the courts of which were selected by the parties. By
contrast, no reference is made to the law of the State, the courts of which have been dero-
gated from by the party agreement.217 Therefore, the fact that the law of the country, whose
jurisdiction is excluded, contains an overriding mandatory provision, does not affect the
validity of the forum selection.
198 This conclusion is not problematic. Since Art. 25 Brussels I Regulation only governs agree-
ments conferring jurisdiction to the court (or the courts) of a Member State, the risk of
avoidance of an overriding provision is quite limited. On one hand, when the provision
belongs to EU law, it will also have to be applied by the selected court. On the other, the
selected court will be able to give effect to the overriding provisions of anotherMember State
under Art. 9 (3); as mentioned above, recourse to this rule should be regarded, in such
circumstances, as the normal solution.218
199 Muchmore delicate is the question of the impact of overriding mandatory provisions on the
validity of choice-of-court agreements conferring jurisdiction to the courts of a non-Mem-
ber State. In this case, the risk of avoidance is much higher. Before the entry into force of the
2005 Hague Choice-of-Court Convention, such agreements were governed only by the
national rules of each Member State, and national courts had given different, contradictory
answers to the question. Thus, the French Cour de cassation decided that the fact that a
provision of French law is overriding does not mean that it impacts on the validity of an
exclusive choice-of-court agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a
foreign country.219 The opposite conclusion was arrived at by the German courts. According
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216 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 33;Mankowski, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 23 Brüssel
I-VO, para. 10; Lüttringhaus IPRax (2014), p. 151.
217 Moreover, since any question of validity of the choice-of-court agreement is now to be decided, in the first
instance, by the selected court(s) under Art. 31 (2), the excluded courts will frequently even lack the
opportunity to check the validity of the agreement against their overriding provisions: Lüttringhaus,
IPRax (2014), p. 151.
218 See supra, Art. 9 para. 169.
219 Cour de cassation, 22.10.2008, RCDIP (2009), p. 69, with a commentary by Bureau/MuirWatt, p. 1 et seq.;
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to the German case law, a choice-of-court agreement should be considered as unenforceable,
when, under the circumstances of the case, it appears that the selected court will not apply a
German overriding mandatory provision such that their decision will not be capable of
being recognised in Germany.220 A similar approach was also followed in some English
cases.221 The 2015 Hague Choice-of-Court Convention does not provide a clear-cut answer.
In fact, it states in Art. 6(c) that that the court seized in violation of an exclusive choice-of-
court agreement shall suspend or dismiss proceedings unless giving effect to the agreement
‘would be manifestly contrary to the public policy’ of the forum. However, while in certain
Contracting States the breach of an overriding mandatory provision might be regarded as a
manifest public policy violation, the same might not be true in other States.
200Overriding mandatory provisions cannot have an automatic impact on the enforceability of
choice-of-court agreements.222 As the German and English position tends to confirm, such
an effect is only justified when a detailed analysis of the circumstances of the case makes
clear that, in the event of non-compliance with a country’s overriding provisions, the de-
cision to be rendered by the foreign selected court will not be capable of recognition in that
country. Failing this, to strike down a priori the choice-of-court agreement would be over-
kill. Therefore, a sort of “recognition prognosis” should be effected, similar to that which is
required in the case of international lis pendens.223
201This is a possible answer to the question. However, one should also consider that the
“recognition prognosis” is particularly delicate when an overriding mandatory provision
is at stake. As a matter of fact, it is possible that the decision to be rendered by the foreign
selected court will be capable of recognition in the State having enacted the overriding
provision. This is for several reasons:
– It should be considered, first, that the parties’ choice of a foreign court does not neces-
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Clunet (2009), p. 599, with a note by Jobard-Bachellier/Train; Dalloz (2009), p. 200, with a note by Jault-
Seseke. An overview on the debate in France is given by Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP (2009), p. 15 et seq.
220 In their more recent decisions, German courts were confronted with cases in which choice-of-court
agreements in favour of US courts would probably lead to the non-compliance with the rules of the
Commercial Agents Directive, which qualify as overriding mandatory provisions according to the In-
gmar case law (on the Ingmar decision, see supra, Art. 9 para. 41): Bundesgerichtshof, 5.9.2012, IHR
(2013), p. 35; Oberlandesgericht Munich, 17.5.2006, IPRax (2007), p. 294. See also the previous decisions
of the Bundesgerichtshof of 30.1.1961, NJW (1961), p. 1061; 21.12.1970, NJW (1971), p. 325; 30.5.1983,
NJW (1983), p. 2772; 12.3.1984, NJW (1984), p. 2037; 15.6.1987, NJW (1987), p. 3193. Among the
scholars, see Rühl IPRax (2007), p. 294 et seq.; Antomo IHR (2013), p. 225 et seq.; Lüttringhaus IPRax
(2014), p. 151.
221 In the case The Hollandia, [1982] 3 All E.R. 1141, the English House of Lords held that an agreement
conferring jurisdiction on the court of a State which was not party to the Hague-Visby Rules was valid,
unless it was established that the chosen forumwould apply a rule limiting the carrier’s liability to a lower
sum than that provided by those rules. In the case Accentuate Ltd v. Asigra Inc of 30.10.2009, [2009]
EWCH 2655, the High Court of Justice held that an arbitration agreement aimed at avoiding the appli-
cation of the Commercial Agents Directive was unenforceable. See also the American decisions in the
Lloyd’s case: Muir Watt, L’affaire Lloyd’s: globalisation des marches et contentieux contractuel, RCDIP
(2002), p. 509 et seq.
222 See also Radicati di Brozolo RCDIP (2003), p. 6 et seq.; Antomo IHR (2013), p. 232.
223 See Art. 33 (1) (a) Brussels I Regulation.
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sarily lead to non-compliance with the overriding mandatory provision in force in the
country, whose courts’ jurisdiction has been derogated from. In fact, it cannot be a priori
excluded that the selected court, based on its own conflict rules, will apply (or give effect
to) that provision as part of the law applicable to the contract, or as foreign overriding
provision under a rule similar to Art. 9 (3) or another equivalent mechanism (such as
public policy or “indirect” application).224
– It is also possible that the foreign court, without giving effect to the overriding provision
at stake, arrives at a similar substantive result by applying the rules of the lex contractus.225
– Certainly, in some instances, it may be evident from the outset that the selected foreign
court will not give effect to the overriding provision in question. Even then, it cannot
always be discounted that the foreign decision will not be capable of recognition and
enforcement in the forum. As a matter of fact, even from the perspective of the enacting
State, non-compliance with an overriding mandatory provision does not always amount
to a violation of public policy.226 Accordingly, if a country’s public policy is not disturbed,
there seems to be no compelling reason for that country’s courts not to honour the
parties’ agreement conferring jurisdiction on a foreign court.
202 It is evident that a prognosis based on these factors is extremely burdensome and time-
consuming for a court. Moreover, it is necessarily tainted with a great amount of uncer-
tainty. That being so, one could wonder whether the solution adopted by the French courts is
not the best one, at least for practical reasons. This implies that a choice-of-court agreement
should, at least in principle, be honoured despite the existence of an overriding mandatory
provision, thus giving a chance to the foreign court to give effect to that provision or, at least,
to get to a similar result. If, at the end of the day, the foreign decision proves to be irrecon-
cilable with the overriding provision, it will always be possible for the State concerned to
deny it recognition and enforcement a posteriori.227
203 A similar reasoning has often led national courts to recognize the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements, notwithstanding the fact that the dispute in question involved the public
policy or the lois de police of one or more States.228 In such circumstances, national courts
often reserved the right to have a “second look” on the arbitral award, to be sure that the local
overriding policies were not disregarded by the arbitrators.229 Certainly, the solution adop-
ted in the field of arbitration cannot automatically be transposed to litigation before state
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224 See supra Art. 9 paras. 186 et seq.
225 This reasoning was followed by the American courts in the Lloyd’s case: Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP
(2009), p. 12.
226 See infra, Art. 9 para. 210.
227 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 33.
228 This sort of reasoning led the US Supreme Court, in the landmarkMitsubishi case, to accept the arbitra-
bility of disputes involving the violation of US anti-trust statutes: 473 US 614 (1985). In Switzerland, it is
also uncontroversial that a dispute is capable of being settled by arbitration even if it involves public
policy issues: DTF 118 II 353 (1992), Fincantieri. In the same vein, see the recent decision of the French
Cour de cassation of 8.7.2010, Doga RCDIP (2010), p. 743, with a note by Bureau/Muir-Watt.
229 This approachwas initiated by an often cited passage of the US SupremeCourt in theMitsubishi case: 473
US 614 (1985), footnote 19. The European Court of Justice also held that the non-compliance by arbi-
trators with the EU anti-trust legislation implies a public policy violation, which the Member States’
courts must sanction if they are seized with an action to set aside the award: Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v.
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courts.230 With respect to the question at hand, however, some consistency between the
solutions retained in these two areas of law is desirable, because both arbitration and choice-
of-court agreements can be used by the parties as alternative means for avoiding a country’s
overriding provisions.
204Some authors seem to consider that this solution is unsatisfactory, because, on one hand, not
all foreign decisions need to be recognised and enforced in the State that has enacted an
overriding provision231 and, on the other, the non-compliance with such a provision is not
always sanctioned by a denial of recognition. This would lead to “inactivating” overriding
provisions.232 However, one should consider that if the decision does not need to be recog-
nised and enforced in the forum State, a party could in any event escape from that State’s
overriding provision by simply seizing a court abroad. Under such circumstances, the claim
of a country to impose compliance with its own overriding provision seems in any event
rather unrealistic. On the other hand, the fact that a State is not prepared to deny recognition
to a foreign decision seems to indicate that its interest in the enforcement of its own policies
is, after all, not so crucial. A fortiori, this should not lead to striking down a freely negotiated
choice-of-forum agreement.
205Admittedly, our approach can cause some inconvenience to the parties who rely on the
application of an overriding provision. That party will first be subject to the jurisdiction of
the selected court and will have access to the courts of the State having enacted the over-
riding provision only once (and if) the selected court’s decision is denied recognition.
However, it is not certain that the parties’ interest would be better protected by the opposite
solution. One should consider that, even if the choice of court agreement is denied enforce-
ment in the State having enacted the overriding provision, it will normally be regarded as
valid in the country of the selected court. This will frequently lead to parallel proceedings
and, in the end, to a denial of recognition of the decision rendered in the country of the
overriding provision.233 That being so, respecting the choice-of-court agreement is probably
the most promising way to achieve harmonious solutions, in particular if the foreign court
can be convinced of the opportunity to take into account the overriding mandatory provi-
sion.234
206Should the answer be different when the overriding provision is not purely national, but is
based on EU law? It has been suggested that the EU law principle of effectiveness (“effet
utile”) would require theMember States’ courts to strike down a choice-of-forum agreement
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Benetton International NV, (case C-126/97) (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 3055. The same should apply at the
stage of recognition and enforcement of the award.
230 Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP (2009), p. 14 et seq.; Rühl IPRax (2007), p. 300 et seq.
231 Thorn, in: Rauscher (2011), Art. 9 Rom I-VO, para. 33.
232 Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP 108 (2009), 1, 18, 22.
233 Thus, in the most recent cases decided by the German courts (see supra, note 210), the commercial agent
was recognised as having the right to seize German courts notwithstanding the choice of a court in the
US. Therefore, he was able to obtain a decision based on the provisions implementing the Commercial
Agents Directive. However, that decision will probably have very little chance to be recognised and
enforced in the US, at the domicile of the principal, because the forum selection agreement is probably
regarded as perfectly valid there.
234 Contra: Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP 108 (2009), 1, 13.
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whenever it can lead to non-compliance with an overriding mandatory provision of EU
law.235 However, this approach seems overly strict. In the field of arbitration, the European
Court of Justice held that, if an arbitral award fails to comply with overriding mandatory
provisions of EU law (in particular, antitrust rules), a Member States’ court seized with
annulment proceedings should set aside the award as being contrary to the European public
policy.236 By doing so, the Court impliedly recognised that the dispute was capable of being
decided by arbitration and that the validity of the arbitration agreement was not in question.
Mutatis mutandis, we consider that, notwithstanding the existence of a EU law overriding
provision, the principle of effectiveness does not necessarily require that the choice of forum
in a third country is struck down, provided that non-compliance with that provision is then
sanctioned at the stage of recognition and enforcement.
2. Overriding mandatory provisions and the recognition and enforcement of
foreign decisions
207 Can non-compliance with a country’s overriding mandatory provisions be sanctioned in
that country by a denial of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign decision? The
answer to this question depends on the circumstances.
208 It should be noted, first, that in the EU Member States recognition and enforcement of
decisions in contractual disputes is governed by different sources. The Brussels I Regulation
and the Lugano Convention are applicable when the decision was rendered, respectively, in
another Member State or in an EFTA State party to the Lugano Convention. Decisions
rendered in “third” States are still governed by the national recognition rules of the single
Member States, subject to other specific, mostly bilateral, treaties. Notwithstanding this
plurality of sources, some common points can be identified.
209 It is worth mentioning, first, that the overriding mandatory provisions cannot prevail as
such over a foreign decision. The almost universal prohibition of a “révision au fond”237
makes it impossible for the courts of the requested State to reform a foreign decision by
imposing the direct application of the local provisions. Of course, if recognition is denied, it
will normally be possible to initiate fresh proceedings in that State, in which the courts will
be able to apply the overriding provisions of the lex fori.
210 In certain cases, recognition and enforcement can be denied on the ground that the foreign
court lacked jurisdiction (so-called “indirect” jurisdiction). This is for instance the case
when the jurisdiction of the courts in the requested State was exclusive.238 The same also
applies when the jurisdiction of the foreign court was based on a choice-of-court agreement
which is considered as unenforceable in the requested State.239 In this respect, the solution
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235 Rühl IPRax 2007, 298 et seq.
236 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV, (case C-126/97), (1999), ECR 1999-I, p. 3055.
237 See Art. 52 Brussels Ibis Regulation.
238 See Art. 45 (1) (e) Brussels Ibis Regulation.
239 Of course, if the choice-of-court agreement is considered as enforceable, it will not be possible to invoke a
lack of indirect jurisdiction to deny recognition and enforcement: Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP (2009),
p. 19.
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given to the question of the enforceability of choice-of-court agreements240 is also relevant
for the purpose of recognition and enforcement.
211When a lack of jurisdiction cannot be invoked, a denial of recognition and enforcement can
be based on a violation of the public policy of the requested State.241 In many countries, the
notion of public policy not only includes fundamental rights and moral values, but also
covers the essential policies of the countries. Thus, overriding interests relating to a coun-
try’s social, economic or political organization are often regarded as a part of that country’s
public policy.
212It should be noted, however, that, in international situations, the notion of public policy is
conceived inmore andmore narrow terms: “international” public policy is not equivalent to
“domestic” public policy.242 This is particularly true in the relationship among the EU
Member States. Thus, it is clear under the Brussels I Regulation that the limits of the concept
of public policy are fixed by EU law and can be reviewed by the European Court of Justice.243
Therefore, it may happen that the interests promoted by certain overriding provisions are
not covered by the restrictive notion of public policy.244 Furthermore, it is widely admitted
that the role of public policy is particularly limited when it comes to recognition and
enforcement of foreign decisions, as opposed to the application of foreign law. As is well
known, a decision can only be regarded as contrary to public policy when it leads to a result
that cannot be tolerated in the requested State. Therefore, the simple fact that an overriding
mandatory provision of that State was not applied (nor given effect to), does not justify, in
itself, a denial of recognition. Even if the foreign court did not apply the overriding provi-
sion, it may well be that it arrived at a result which is equivalent, or at least compatible with,
the fundamental interests of the requested country.245 For all of these reasons, it is possible
that non-compliance with overriding mandatory provisions is not sanctioned.
Article 10: Consent and material validity
1. The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the
law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.
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240 See supra, Art. 9 paras. 195 et seq.
241 Bureau/Muir Watt RCDIP 98 (2009), p. 18 et seq.
242 This phenomenon is even more accentuated in the field of arbitration, where there is a strong trend, at
least in certain jurisdictions, to reserve the use of public policy to the violation of only universally
accepted principles and values (“transnational public policy”), with the exclusion of those specific States’
interests which are normally furthered by overriding mandatory provisions. See for instance BGE 132 III
389: non-compliance with a country’s antitrust laws never amounts to a public policy violation. However,
this very liberal trend should not automatically be extended to state courts’ litigation.
243 See supra, Art. 9 paras. 59 and 98.
244 SeeRémy, Exception d’ordre public etmécanisme des lois de police en droit international privé (2008), on
the distinction between the public policy values and the objectives of the lois de police.
245 Once again, this trend is particularly strong in the field of arbitration. Thus, the French Cour de cassation
held that the non-compliance with antitrust rules only amounts to a public policy violation when it is
“blatant, effective and concrete”, i.e. when it is self-evident (“ça crève les yeux”): see Cass. RCDIP 95
(2006), 104 with note Bollée; Cass. Rev. arb. 2008, with note Loquin.
